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About five years ago, I published an article exploring the areas in
which reported tax malpractice cases arose.' As a secondary inquiry, that
article, hereinafter referred to as Malpractice I, also focused on the
measure of damages awarded in such cases. The result of that study
indicated that many of those cases involved general malpractice in a tax
context, as opposed to "tax malpractice." Many of the errors involved
missing time deadlines, such as late-filing and non-filing of tax returns.
Other errors included "ignoring or overlooking some simple, clearly
mandated requirement such as making an election or obtaining consent"
when necessary.2 Apart from a large number of tax shelter-related cases,
which arose from the tax shelter frenzy of the late 1970s and early 1980s,
and cases in the estate planning/estate and gift tax area, Malpractice I was
unable to identify or predict any area or areas of tax practice more likely
than others to spawn tax malpractice litigation.3 Malpractice I did allay
my worst fear that due to the complexity of the tax law there would be
innumerable instances of tax malpractice involving virtually every section
of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). 4
In the years since the publication of Malpractice 1, I have received a
number of calls and e-mails from practitioners inquiring as to whether, in
the course of my research, I had encountered a situation "on all fours" with
the one they were working on. One of these inquiries even led me to
explore whether issuing an incorrect federal information return, such as a
W-2 form or a form 1099, could be the basis of a tort recovery similar to
recoveries for tax malpractice. 5 These inquiries convinced me of the
continuing importance of this area. As if further encouragement were
needed, the recent Internal Revenue Service (IRS) crackdown on attorneys
and accountants involved in the sale of overly aggressive and likely flawed
tax shelters 6 following in the footsteps of a number of financial scandals-
such as Enron, which had accounting and tax machinations at its core -
1 Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the Areas in Which
Malpractice Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547 (1999).
2 Id. at 551.
3 Id at 641-42.
4 Id. at 551.
5 Jacob L. Todres, Torts, Tax Reporting and Preemption: Is There Tort Liability For
Incorrect Information Reports?, 28 J. CORP. L. 259, 260 (2003).
6 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gary, Year In Review: Tax Shelter Crackdown Efforts Steer
Government Policy, 102 TAx NOTES 35, 35 (2004); Press Release, Internal Revenue Service,
Tax Day Reminder: Treasury & IRS Continue Crackdown on Abusive Tax Shelters (Apr. 15,
2003), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-03-51.pdf.
7 See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF
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emphasized the importance to society of a developed and principled body
of law governing when and to what extent professional advisors might be
held financially responsible for their advice.
Primarily, this Article will analyze the tax malpractice cases that have
been reported since Malpractice I was published from the vantage of
substantive tax law to attempt to ascertain whether certain areas of tax law
or certain aspects of tax practice seem to generate more malpractice claims
than others. As a secondary inquiry, the Article will discuss the proper
measure of damages recoverable on account of such malpractice.
This Article focuses solely on reported cases. It examines instances
of claimed malpractice involving federal income, estate, gift, and
generation skipping taxes. It does not focus on other federal taxes such as
employment taxes. While state and local taxes are not intended to be
focused upon separately, this Article discusses several cases that involve
allegations of wrong advice in connection with state sales tax8 and state
personal property tax.9 While I have attempted to locate and review all of
the reported cases, I acknowledge the possibility, or more accurately, the
likelihood, that I missed some,'0 especially since tax malpractice situations
continue to sometimes lurk in esoteric venues. For instance, I will discuss
an interpleader action where the court allocated the proceeds from a tax
malpractice settlement," and an action to set aside a divorce settlement
that refers to a previous tax malpractice litigation arising from the same
divorce. 12
Both tax attorneys and accountants are focused on in this study.
While, from a purely theoretical standpoint, it might be desirable to
ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND
COMPENSATION ISSUES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (2003) (discussing the unscrupulous
accounting practices in Enron and making recommendations for future legislation), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/5-3-03-voll.pdf; Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner, Second
Interim Report, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG), at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23 2003),
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/InteriiReport2ofExaminer.pdf.
8 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Inphoto Surveillance, Inc. v. Crowe, Chizek & Co., 788
N.E.2d 216 (I11. App. Ct. 2003), and CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, 7 P.3d 979 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2000)).
9 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing Crowe, Chizek & Co. v. Oil Tech., Inc, 771 N.E.2d 1203
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).
10 A similar disclaimer in Malpractice I was cited by a fellow academic in a different field.
See Robert M. Jarvis, The Erring Proctor: Admiralty Lawyers and Malpractice Claims, 31 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 407, 408 n.4 (2000). Apparently, I am becoming more known for what I do not
know than for what I do.
1 See discussion infra Part II.D.2.d (discussing Murphy v. Comptroller of the Treasury,
207 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Md. 2002)).
12 See discussion infra Part IID. 1.d (examining In re Marriage of Bielawski, 764 N.E.2d
1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), which addresses this issue in greater detail).
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analyze these professions separately, the pragmatic truth is that the
dividing line between the work of the tax attorney and the accountant, at
best, has always been murky.13 It is not possible to separate out the two
professions. The dividing line may have become murkier when Congress,
in 1998, extended the traditional attorney-client privilege to accountants,
as well as to other tax practitioners. 14 There are instances where attorneys
and accountants share the role of defendant.' 5  In many situations, the
defendant-practitioner could just as easily be from one profession as from
the other. Given the interchangeability of these two professions in the
malpractice area, many courts simply hold both professions to the same
malpractice standards. 16
The results of this update are roughly consistent with the results of
Malpractice I. The area that seems to generate the most cases, as it did
before, is estate planning, or more specifically, the estate and gift tax cases
discussed in Part II.D.2. These cases generally involve planning the
transmission of property to one's heirs at the least possible tax cost.' 7
The tax shelter area, which generated a relatively large number of
cases in Malpractice I, was pretty quiet during recent years. However,
with the IRS's current aggressive pursuit of investors in tax shelters,' 8 a
wave of malpractice suits against the accountants and attorneys involved in
facilitating or even promoting these unsuccessful shelters seems to be just
over the horizon, perhaps to come into full view in five to ten or fifteen
years ("Malpractice III" or even "Malpractice IV"?).19 Beyond the estate
planning area, more cases have arisen in the very broad general negligence
13 See, e.g., National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs, Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants: A Study ofInterprofessional Relations, 36 TAx LAW. 26, 27, 30-31 (1982).
14 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3411 (a), 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (adding new I.R.C. § 7525).
15 See, e.g., discussion infra Part lI.D.2.b (discussing Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452 (Haw. 2001)
in greater depth).
16 See, e.g., Hnath v. Vecchitto, No. X03CV930502910, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1063, at
*22 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 2003); see also Todres, supra note 1, at 551 n.13.
17 While the generation skipping transfer tax, codified in I.R.C. §§ 2601-2661, would also
seem to belong in this category, to date I have not uncovered any case involving this tax. But see
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-032 (June 9, 1997) (ruling on the potential future use of the generation
skipping transfer tax exemption for taxpayers who were in the midst of suing their former
accountants for failing to allocate the exemptions to trusts they set up for the plaintiffs' children);
Martin D. Begleiter, First Let's Sue All the Lawyers - What Will We Get: Damages for Estate
Planning Malpractice, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 361-62 (2000).
'8 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., infra Part II.D. I .e( I) (discussing Sommerville v. Hochman Salkin & DeRoy, No.
G030625, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1624 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2004), and Lofton v.
KPMG, L.L.P., No. 02-81166-CIV, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2003); see
also Sheryl Stratton, Clients Sue E&Y and Three Law Firms Over Tax Shelter, 97 TAX NOTES
1649, 1649, 1652-53 (2002) (describing another case that is not yet reported).
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areas, including late filing, non-filing and negligent preparation, than in
any other specific area. As before, only a relatively small number of cases
address the issue of what types of damages are recoverable, and much
work remains to be done in this area.
Before presenting the results of this study in Part II, Part I will briefly
review some elementary background principles, such as the elements of
the malpractice cause of action and the measure of damages. Concluding
observations will follow.
I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
A. Elements of a Malpractice Cause ofAction20
Civil actions for tax malpractice are usually based on either traditional
tort or traditional contract theories .2  Under traditional tort principles, a
professional has a duty "to exercise the level of skill, care and
diligence... [normally] exercised by other members of the profession
under similar circumstances," whereas traditional contract principles
impose the obligation to perform the task undertaken diligently and
competently.2 2 In practice, these two standards, though emanating from
different areas of the law, are virtually identical. The professional,
therefore, must exercise reasonable competence and diligence to avoid
malpractice exposure.23
While the basic standard of care is almost identical under tort and
contract theories, other aspects of the causes of action and/or defenses
thereto may differ depending on which theory is utilized. Differences are
usually encountered in the statute of limitations (both how long and when
it commences), the measure of damages, to whom liability extends (i.e.,
privity), and evidentiary matters, such as the need for expert testimony.24
Several recent cases underscored that differences remain between the two
theories and the need to carefully comply with the requirements of each
theory. For example, in Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc.,25 the court denied
recovery under a number of different tort theories, while permitting
26
recovery under a contract theory. In Tony Smith Trucking v. Woods &
20 This section is adapted from Malpractice L Todres, supra note 1, at 552-53.
21 BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 601.1 (5th ed. 1999).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 426.
25 No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002), af'd,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17723 (1st Cir. 2004); see infra Part II.B.1.
26 Sorenson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689, at *19-42. The alleged torts included
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, professional malpractice, intentional/negligent infliction of
1016 [Vol.78:1011
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Woods, Ltd.,27 the plaintiffs attempted to qualify for the longer five-year
contract statute of limitations instead of the three-year tort statute by
arguing that a contract was formed when their accountant signed the power
of attorney form to represent them at the IRS audit. The court rejected this
argument and held a contract exists only if a specific promise or
undertaking is present. If the allegation is simply of a breach of the
general duty to act diligently, the claim is for negligence, not for breach of
contract.28
Normally, the malpractice tort asserted against an attorney is a
specific application of the ordinary tort of negligence. The attorney must
act as a reasonably competent and careful professional would act under
similar circumstances.29 Since tax law generally is perceived as a
specialty, the standard of care may be higher than in other attorney
malpractice situations. 30 To establish a prima facie cause of action, a
plaintiff must show: "(1) a duty owed by the attorney to the plaintiff... ;
(2) breach of that duty... ; (3) injuries suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) a
proximate cause between the injury suffered and the attorney's breach of
duty.'
The standards for accountants are similar to those for attorneys.
Accounting is a learned profession and practitioners must act as would a
reasonably competent and careful member of the same profession under
the same circumstances. The elements of the prima facie cause of action
against the accountant are the same as those listed above against an
32
attorney. Many cases simply equate the elements of the causes of action
and the standard of care in accountant and attorney situations.33
emotional distress and intentional or negligent misrepresentation. Id. at *3-4. In addition to
obtaining recovery under a breach of contract claim the plaintiff also recovered under the state's,
(Massachusetts) Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at *58, 61-62.
27 55 S.W.3d 327 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001); see infra Part II.C.
28 Tony Smith Trucking, 55 S.W.3d at 331.
29 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 601.2.1.
30 See id. § 603.3; see also 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 23.26 (5th ed. 2000); Todres, supra note 1, at 553-54.
31 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 601.2.1 (citations omitted). The essence of the cause
of action is comprised of the four elements listed despite the fact that some court sometimes list
only three elements. See, e.g., Montes v. Asher & Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 637, 638 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (listing the elements as duty, breach and injury or damages); Boardman v. Stark, No.
20911, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3790, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2002) (duty, breach and
causal connection between the conduct and the damages); Jones v. Bresset, 47 Pa. D. & C.4th 60,
70 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 2000) (listing, duty, breach and proximate cause). Similarly, in other
contexts, a fifth element (causation in fact) is added. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 114 (2001).
32 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 601.2.2.
33 See Todres, supra note 1, at 551 n.13; see also Hnath v. Vecchitto, No.
X03CV930502910, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1063, at *22 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 2003)
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Nevertheless, there are differences between the two professions that must
be kept in mind. For instance, there might be different statutes of
limitations 34 and, since the precise nature of the work each professional is
called upon to do may differ, a suit against an attorney and an accountant
stemming from the same set of facts might have different outcomes.35
While the normal malpractice cause of action involves the tort of
negligence, other torts are also encountered. Sorenson v. H&R Block,
Inc.,36 is a good illustration, containing, in addition to negligence and
breach of contract claims, allegations of breach of fiduciary duty,
professional malpractice, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional or
negligent misrepresentation, and false and deceptive trade practices under
state law.37  Alleged violations of federal securities laws38 and RICO
violations 39 may also arise.
Since the tort of negligence is normally encountered in tax
malpractice cases, unless specifically indicated otherwise, it will be
assumed herein that this is the tort alleged.
B. Measure of Damages
The general tort measure of damages, which also applies in
malpractice situations, allows a plaintiff to recover for all injuries
proximately caused by the defendant's negligent conduct. The plaintiff
may recover the difference between his or her present economic position
and the position he or she would have been in absent the negligence.4°
All damages caused are recoverable, even indirect or consequential
damages, as long as they are the proximate result of the defendant's
negligence.41 However, most courts do not award damages for emotional
pain and suffering where, such as in the malpractice area, the basic injury
(adopting same accrual of cause of action date for accountant as for attorney).
34 See, e.g., Inphoto Surveillance, Inc. v. Crowe, Chizek & Co., 788 N.E.2d 216, 218 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003) (interpreting Illinois' "statute of repose" applicable to accountants, 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/13-214.2 (West 2002)).
35 For example, see Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452 (Haw. 2001), in which the cause of action
against the attorney was permitted to proceed (no privity/lack of standing defense rejected) while
the cause of action against the accountant was not permitted to proceed (no-privity defense
accepted). See also infra Part II.D.2.b (discussing Blair in more detail).
" No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002).
37 Id. at *3-4. There was also an allegation of loss of consortium. Id.
38 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 605.2.3; Todres, supra note 1, at 634.
39 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 30, § 23.26.
40 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 605.1.1; Todres, supra note 1, at 643-45.
41 See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 605.1.2.
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suffered is only an economic one. 2To be recoverable, the damages must
be actually incurred, not merely speculative ones that may arise in the
future.43 Additionally, under appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff is
entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages." The normal duty
generally recognized to mitigate damages resulting from a defendant's
negligence is also applicable.45 Similarly, under the so called "American
Rule," attorney's fees incurred to bring the malpractice action are not
generally recoverable.46 Such nonrecoverable litigation costs should be
distinguished from normally recoverable consequential damages, such as
attorney or accountant fees and other costs incurred to correct, or attempt
to correct, the effects of the defendant's negligence.47
II. ANALYSIS
A. Preliminary
1. Duty of Competence
Before turning to the main focus of this article-the substantive tax
areas that have generated malpractice cases and the correct measure of
damages-malpractice liability due to the breach of the duty of
competence should be reviewed. During the last five years, there have not
been any dramatic developments in this area. The cases seem to follow the
reasonably well established principles discussed in Malpractice J,48 though
normal development and refinement have continued. In the area of the
mere error in judgment rule, an alternative approach mentioned in
Malpractice 149 has been followed in its own state and in another, but it is
yet too early to call it a trend.
The general duty of competence requires the tax practitioner-
whether attorney or accountant-to meet the minimum competency level
of his or her profession and "to exercise the skill, knowledge and ordinary
care exercised by other members of their profession under similar
circumstances. 5 °
42 Id.; see, e.g., McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse L.L.P., 971 P.2d 414, 422 (Or. Ct. App.
1998).
43 See WOLFMAN, ET AL., supra note 21, § 605.1.1.
44 Id. § 605.1.3.
45 Id. § 605.2.2.
46 Id. § 605.1.1.
47 Id.; see also Todres, supra note 1, at 644.
48 See Todres, supra note 1, at 553-70.
49 See id. at 559 (discussing Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799 (Mass. 1996)).
50 Id. at 553; see also WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 603.
10192004]
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If a professional holds her or himself out as possessing expertise in a
field recognized as requiring special skills beyond those of an ordinary
member of the profession, she or he will be held to a higher standard of
care. Such a standard requires a professional to exhibit similar levels of
skill and diligence as others in the same specialty. 51 Tax law is one such
professional field that has been "recognized as... requiring the higher
level of the 'specialist's' skill. '5 2 Recent cases have continued to apply
these standards. 3
An important basic assumption of the higher standards is that they
apply to professionals; i.e., to a member of a learned profession. In
Leather v. United States Trust Co.,54 the First Department of the New York
Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the
professional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action, and
affirmed the refusal to dismiss the plaintiffs breach of contract cause of
action.55 In affirming the dismissal of the malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty claims against the defendant, which was a financial
planning company, the court pointedly stated:
We add that plaintiff makes no showing that defendants were engaged in
a "profession," i.e., "an occupation generally associated with long-term
educational requirements leading to an advanced degree, licensure
evidencing qualifications met prior to engaging in the occupation, and
control of the occupation by adherence to standards of conduct, ethics
and malpractice liability."
56
In short, the defendant was not a "professional."
Similarly, in Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc.,57 in dismissing several of
the tort causes of action against the defendant, the court noted that neither
H&R Block nor the individual defendant, who was a Block employee,
were "professionals;" that is either attorneys or accountants. 58 Thus, the
court found no authority under relevant Massachusetts law that created a
51 See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 603.3; Todres, supra note 1, at 553-54.
52 See Todres, supra note 1, at 554.
53 See, e.g., Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah, L.L.P., No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS
461, at *19 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002); see also discussion infra Part II.D. lb.
279 A.D.2d 311, 720 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1st Dep't 2001); see also discussion infra Part
I1D.1.e.(3) (examining Leather in greater detail). Another case discussed herein in which the
primary defendants were neither attorneys nor accountants is Finderne Management Co. v.
Barrett, 809 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002), as discussed in Part II.E.5. Here, however, a CPA
was a third party defendant.
55 See Leather, 279 A.D.2d at 311-12, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
56 Id. at 311, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 449-50 (quoting Santiago v. 1370 Broadway Assocs., 264
A.D.2d 624, 624-25, 695 N.Y.S.2d 326, 326 (1st Dep't 1999)).
57 No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002).
58 See the extensive discussion of Sorenson infra Part II.B. 1
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fiduciary duty as a matter of law between a return preparer and his client.5 9
Furthermore, there was no state law that even recognized a professional
60
malpractice cause of action against a return preparer.
At the other end of the spectrum is Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah, L.L.P.,6 '
in which malpractice was committed by an of-counsel at defendant's law
firm, who was not a member of a state bar.62 Since both the individual and
the law firm deliberately and consciously held the individual out as an
attorney, he was subject to the liability of an attorney.6 3 Moreover, since
the individual was held out as a specialist in a wide variety of corporate
law specialties, he was "held to the higher standard applied to specialists in
those areas.,
64
The mere error in judgment rule, however, assures that the law does
not impose upon professionals an implied guaranty of result. In fact, "it is
well settled that where a practitioner's judgment concerning a doubtful or
unsettled area of law is based on adequate research and careful
consideration of the matter, the fact that the judgment turns out to be
incorrect will not give rise to a cause of action for negligence."
65
Malpractice I recognized that Massachusetts took a different
approach to tax malpractice in Williams v. Ely.66 Under Williams, "the
client must be advised of the unsettled status of the law and given the
opportunity to knowingly assess the risks and knowingly elect from among
available alternative courses of conduct." Failure to so advise clients
results in malpractice.67  This approach has been followed in
Massachusetts 68 and adopted by Nebraska.
69
2. Scope of Engagement
Whenever any professional is retained, a clear, definitive agreement
delineating the precise scope of the services to be rendered is most
59 Sorenson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689, at *19.
60 See id. at *31.
61 No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 461 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002).
Pytka is discussed infra, Part II.D. 1 .b.
62 Id. at *5, 7-8.
63 Id. at *19, 27.
64 Id. at *19.
65 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 603.5; see also Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw.
2001) ("An attorney cannot be held liable ... for an error as to a question of law on which
reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers.").
66 668 N.E.2d 799 (Mass. 1996).
67 Id. at 806; Todres, supra note 1, at 559.
68 See, e.g., Pytka, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 461, at *19.
69 See, e.g., Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 103, 106-07
(Neb. 1999).
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important. Jones v. Bresset70 illustrates the benefit of such an agreement.
Jones arose out of a series of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by the
plaintiff, his partner, and their partnership. A number of attorneys were
involved in these bankruptcy actions. The present litigation was a
malpractice suit against the fifth, sixth, and seventh attorneys.
71
Bresset, the fifth attorney, was the primary target of the malpractice
action. The complaint alleged, among other things, that he withdrew the
plaintiffs objections to IRS claims without the plaintiffs consent, and that
he failed to assure the plaintiffs tax returns were filed in a timely manner
by the accountants retained by Bresset.72 Other defendants were the sixth
attorney, Sayers, who had been hired for tax advice regarding plaintiffs
obligations to the IRS,73 and the seventh attorney, Murray, who had been
hired solely "to obtain an accounting in the Bankruptcy Court from
Bresset. ' '74  In an obvious attempt to overcome statute of limitations
obstacles in the case against Bresset, the plaintiff charged his subsequent
attorneys with failure to advise the plaintiff of the possibility of a
malpractice action against Bresset.75 However, Murray's representation
was limited "to obtaining an accounting from Mr. Bresset," and expressly
provided it would not extend to any other causes of action. 76 Further, in
subsequent correspondence, Murray reiterated the extent of, and
limitations upon, his representation. 77 Based on this evidence, Murray
obtained summary judgment dismissing the complaint. 78
In Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus, the defendant attorney was similarly
absolved of liability. 79 Here, the plaintiff sought to recover damages,
alleging that the defendant negligently failed to advise him of the tax
savings obtainable by means of a qualified disclaimer.80  The evidence
disclosed that the attorney was specifically retained for other services but
not to render tax or financial advice to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the
attorney advised plaintiff to obtain such advice elsewhere.81  The
70 47 Pa. D & C.4th 60 (Ct. Com. P1. 2000).
71 Id. at 61-63.
72 Id. at 66.
71 Id. at 63.
74 Id. at 63-64.
75 Id. at 66-67. Murray was also charged with failing to advise plaintiff of a possible cause
of action against Sayers. Id. at 67.
76 Id. at 63.
77 Id. at 63-64.
78 Id. at 74-75.
7' 765 A.2d 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001); see infra Part II.D.2.c.
80 Estate of Fitzgerald, 765 A.2d at 253; see infra Part II.D.2.c (discussing qualified
disclaimers).
81 Estate of Fitzgerald, 765 A.2d at 255.
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attorney's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was
therefore granted.82
Unlike the attorneys in Jones and Estate of Fitzgerald, who had
clearly delineated representation agreements and therefore avoided a trial,
the defendant accountant in Hunter's Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Shernow
83
was not so fortunate. In Hunter's Ambulance Service, the plaintiff
corporation alleged that the defendant accountant, Shernow, participated in
the corporation's decision to settle a malpractice case against a previous
accountant for $35,000 and negligently failed to alert the corporation to the
true magnitude of its potential tax exposure, which ran into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars.84 Shernow claimed that he did not participate in the
decision to settle but, instead, was simply informed of the decision after it
had been reached.85 Though Shernow was ultimately victorious, the issue
of his involvement in the settlement agreement required a trial, as there
was no clearly delineated engagement arrangement.
86
Cohen v. Shaines87 also illustrates the importance of defining the
precise scope of an attorney's engagement. Cohen arose in a very unusual
context. Here, it was not the client who sued the tax advisor; rather, it was
the client's accountant who sued the client's attorney for contribution
based upon a breach of duty owed by the attorney to the client.
In Cohen defendant attorney, Shaines, was the long-standing attorney
for Mrs. Levy and her closely held corporation. In the late 1980s,
following the death of Mrs. Levy's husband, Shaines became more
involved in her estate planning decisions, which included the transfer of
stock in her corporation by Mrs. Levy to her son.88 These transfers
exhausted almost all of Mrs. Levy's unified estate and gift tax credit.89 By
1993, Mrs. Levy's corporation owed her approximately $900,000. The
plaintiff, Cohen, who was Mrs. Levy's certified public accountant,
proposed capitalizing these loans for estate planning purposes.9° In July
82 Id. at 253.
83 798 A.2d 991 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
84 Id. at 994-95.
85 Id. at 999.
86 Id. at 998-99.
87 No. 00-396-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370 (D.N.H. 2001).
88 Id. at *1-4.
89 Id. at *4. During the relevant time period, under the estate and gift tax laws, a unified
credit was available that enabled a taxpayer to transfer $600,000, either by gift or at death,
without incurring any gift or estate tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1994) (current version I.R.C.
§§ 2010, 2505 (2000 & Supp. 12001)).
90 Cohen, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *4-5. While the court does not give any details
of the proposal, presumably the loan was to be forgiven and treated as a contribution by Mrs.
Levy to the corporation.
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1993, Mrs. Levy, Cohen and Shaines attended a meeting in Shaines' office
to discuss Cohen's proposal. The proposal's efficacy depended on the
availability of Mrs. Levy's unified credit, which Shaines allegedly knew
was already utilized and not available. Notwithstanding this knowledge,
Shaines remained silent and acquiesced in the proposal. In due course, the
decision was effectuated and Cohen prepared tax returns for Mrs. Levy and
her corporation reflecting the capitalization of the loans. In 1996, the IRS
audited Mrs. Levy's 1993 tax returns and determined that the loan
capitalizations constituted taxable gifts by Mrs. Levy. In the absence of
the unified credit, Mrs. Levy paid approximately $135,000 in additional
taxes and interest. 9' She filed a malpractice suit against her accountant,
Cohen, who settled with Mrs. Levy, but then commenced this action
against Shaines for contribution.
92
The theory behind Cohen's action for contribution was that Shaines
had a duty to advise Mrs. Levy that Cohen's proposed loan recapitalization
would not work because Shaines was Mrs. Levy's long-standing attorney
who had previously given Mrs. Levy the tax-related, estate planning advice
that exhausted her unified credit. By remaining silent, Shaines breached
this duty and-together with Cohen's own negligence in not determining
whether a unified credit was available-proximately caused the additional
taxes and interest.
93
Shaines' defense was that he was not retained to advise Mrs. Levy
with respect to Cohen's loan capitalization proposal.94 Despite Mrs.
Levy's affidavit in support of Shaines's position,95 the court did not grant
Shaines' motion for summary judgment.96  Ultimately, the court was
troubled by the fact that the meeting at which Cohen's proposal was
discussed occurred in Shaines' office and Shaines attended the meeting,
but there was no explanation for his presence.
With no indication in the record of "[w]hy Shaines attended the
meeting, the nature of his role at the meeting, and the scope of his legal
engagement," the court held Shaines was not entitled to summary
judgment.97 The obvious lesson of this case is that a clear and precise
9' Id. at *1-6.
92 Id. at *6.
9' Id. at *6-7.
94 Id. at *10.
9' Id. at *10-11.
96 Shaines actually moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. However, since
materials beyond the complaint were introduced the motion was treated as one for summary
judgment. Id. at * 1-2.
97 id. at *"18-19.
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agreement specifying Shaines' scope of engagement might have resulted in
summary judgment and the avoidance of a trial.
B. Tax Return Preparation/Filing
1. In General
Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc.,98 is a diabolically fascinating case. The
crux of the complaint involved a Block employee who reported his
suspicions to the IRS99 that the plaintiff planned to file fraudulent 1993
income tax returns before the returns were actually filed. In addition,
during the federal audit of this return, the Block employee allegedly
disclosed internal Block documents revealing prior concerns about the
validity of these tax returns. Allegedly as a consequence of this conduct,
the plaintiff was subjected to state and federal tax audits for several tax
years that resulted in substantial payments of additional taxes and
penalties, and the plaintiff was also subject to a federal criminal
investigation. 00 The suit against Block and the employee for $5 million
ensued.
The facts of the case were as follows. The plaintiff, Sorenson, in
early March 1994, went to a local Block office in Massachusetts for
preparation of his 1993 state and federal income tax returns. Sorenson was
a client of Block's for approximately twenty years, but had only used this
particular branch office for the last three years. At the conclusion of his
consultation, the return preparer informed Sorenson that she would
forward some potential problem areas to her superiors before the return
could be signed and filed. 0 1 The preparer then sent a memorandum to the
Block district manger, Karl Brandenburg, raising concerns over whether
Sorenson could deduct expenses of his political campaign for a position on
the town planning board, and whether Sorenson's donation to charity of
food from a cancelled wedding was deductible. In a later telephone
conversation, a third concern regarding a claim for employee business
expenses was raised.1
0 2
" No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002), aff'd, No.
03-2268, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17723 (1st Cir. 2004). The discussion herein is based on the
district court's opinion which is much more extensive and analytical than the First Circuit's
which essentially affirmed the district court on all points.
99 Id. at *2. There is an indication in the case that the Massachusetts Department of
Revenue was also notified, but most of the discussion in the case concerned only notification of
the IRS. Id. at *48 n. 16.
'00 Id. at *2-3, 12.
10' Id. at *4-5.
102 Id. at *5.
20041 1025
ST JOHN'S LAW RE VIE W
While not overly concerned about the deductibility of the donated
food or employee business expenses, Brandenburg was convinced that the
campaign expenses were not deductible. The local office supervisor
subsequently notified Sorenson that the campaign expenses could not be
taken as a miscellaneous deduction, and Sorenson then sought to deduct
these expenses as charitable contributions.
10 3
Upon learning this, Brandenburg himself contacted Sorenson to
explain that the campaign expenses were not deductible under either
category. Sorenson reacted by placing a call to Block's headquarters to
complain. After hearing of Sorenson's call, Brandenburg contacted his
supervisor, Block's regional administrator Linda Murphy, to express his
adamant opposition to any deduction for the campaign expenses. Later
that day (March 14, 1994), however, Murphy told Brandenburg to file the
return as Sorenson had requested after a Block researcher deemed the
deductions permissible.1
0 4
On March 15, 1994, Brandenburg sent Murphy a memorandum
affirming his position that the campaign expenses deduction was
prohibited, opining that as it stood the return constituted "Fraud in capital
letters."' 5 Attached to the memorandum was a draft letter to Sorenson
requesting further documentation for the campaign expenses, the donated
food, and the employee business expenses.
10 6
Again, Murphy instructed Brandenburg to "drop the matter now," and
the draft letter was not sent. Sorenson's return was electronically filed by
Block the next day, March 16, 1994.1°7
The IRS's Criminal Investigation Division was contacted on March
15, 1994, the day before the return was filed, and received information
regarding Sorenson's "questionable deductions.' 0 8  While the evidence
did not conclusively show that Brandenburg contacted the IRS, it seemed
highly probable that he made the call.' 09
In July 1994, scarcely four months after Sorenson's 1993 tax returns
were filed, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue issued a notice of
audit to Sorenson for his 1991 to 1993 tax returns. The audit determined
that Sorenson was actually a resident of New York, not Massachusetts as
he had claimed, and he should not have deducted certain business
103 Id. at *5-6.
'0 Id. at *6-7.
10' Id. at *7.
106 Id. at *7-8.
107 Id. at *8.
118 Id. at "12.
109 Id. at *13-15. The plaintiff acknowledged that there was a genuine material issue as to
whether Brandenburg made the call. Id. at * 15.
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expenses. Over $8300 in additional taxes, interest and penalties were
assessed.1 10
In June 1995, the IRS notified Sorenson that it would audit his 1993
tax return. Brandenburg accompanied Sorenson to at least two meetings
with the IRS. According to Brandenburg's deposition testimony, he met
with the auditor outside of Sorenson's presence shortly before the first
meeting and showed the auditor some internal Block memoranda
concerning Sorenson's 1993 tax return, including the memorandum that
characterized the return as "Fraud in capital letters."11' Brandenburg
further testified he did this "in order to protect Block's own interests in the
matter, ' 12 and that at a subsequent meeting with the auditor, when asked
for a paper copy of Sorenson's 1993 return, he handed over to the agent a
file containing not only the return but also Block's internal memoranda.
113
Eventually, the IRS audit expanded to include Sorenson's 1992, 1994,
and 1995 returns. Later the IRS also undertook a criminal investigation of
Sorenson. Ultimately, no criminal charges were brought against Sorenson
and the case was settled for over $46,400 in back taxes, interest, and
penalties. 1 14
Sorenson then brought this action against Block and Brandenburg for
$5 million. The complaint alleged three distinct wrongs committed by the
defendants: (1) filing incorrect federal and state tax returns; (2) breaching
a duty of confidentiality by reporting Sorenson's suspected fraud to the
IRS before the 1993 return was filed; and (3) breaching confidentiality by
voluntarily providing the IRS with internal Block documents during
Sorenson's IRS audit, which disclosed concerns regarding the 1993
return. 115  As grounds for relief, the plaintiff alleged a violation of
Massachusetts's False and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, professional malpractice, intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and intentional or negligent
misrepresentation. 
16
The instant case arose on motions for summary judgment by both
parties. While the court granted summary judgment to Sorenson, it was on
the very limited grounds that Block's voluntary disclosure to the IRS
1o Id. at *8.
Id. at *8-9.
112 Id. at *9.
113 Id.
114 Id. at *10-11.
"' Id. at *11-12. But cf id. at *2-3 (where the order is different).
116 Id. at *3-4. There is also a count for loss of consortium by Sorenson's wife, but this is
ignored herein as irrelevant to the discussion.
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during the audit was a breach of contract, and that Block later committed
an unfair and deceptive trade practice. The damages awarded, apart from
an unreported amount of attorneys fees under the Massachusetts False and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, were nominal: return of his 1993 tax
preparation fees, and double his 1994 and 1995 fees. On all remaining
counts, Block was granted summary judgment." 17
While at first blush it may seem surprising that such egregiously
disloyal conduct by a tax preparer towards its client was essentially
without meaningful remedy, an analysis of the court's reasoning may alter
one's view.
The district court commenced its analysis with an examination of the
plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims, and noted that in Massachusetts,
no case law supported imposing a fiduciary duty on a tax return preparer to
the client as a matter of law.118 Nor would the court consider the preparer-
client relationship as an agency relationship since the preparer had no
authority to bind the client, and the client did not have the type of control
over the preparer necessary for an agency relationship as, for instance, the
client would have had over an attorney." 9 Finally, the court held that,
although Massachusetts law recognized the possibility that fiduciary duties
might arise in a particular factual situation on an ad hoc basis, no such duty
existed here. Under Massachusetts law, "while 'a great disparity or
inequality relative to the other party' may give rise to a fiduciary duty, its
breach entails some 'abuse to the benefit of the more powerful party,
particularly where unjust enrichment would result."",120 Here, the court did
not find that Block abused its relationship with Sorenson to gain some
meaningful benefit. The only benefits the court could envision Block
receiving by the disclosure were either to protect Block from the possible
imposition of return preparer penalties or to demonstrate to the IRS that
Block had an effective fraud prevention plan in effect. However, neither
benefit was substantial enough to support a fiduciary claim. The court,
therefore, granted summary judgment to the defendants on these counts.' 2'
17 Id. at "61-63. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals of the First Circuit noted
that the total damages awarded to Sorenson was $630. Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 03-
2268, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17723, at *3 (1st Cir. 2004).
118 Id. at *19.
119 Id. at *21. Massachusetts follows the Restatement of Agency's definition of agency. Id.
at *20-21
120 Id. at *24 (quoting Indus. Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 44 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir.
1995)).
121 Id. at *24-26.
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Next, the court considered Sorenson's claims of negligence and
professional malpractice. 122  Here, too, the defendants were granted
summary judgment because the court could not find any relevant legal
duty that the defendants breached. According to the court, there was no
Massachusetts law that imposed any duty on a tax return preparer that
Block violated, neither by the possibility of inaccurate returns, nor by
Block's disclosures to the IRS.1 23  Thus, a basic element for both
negligence and professional malpractice was missing. With respect to
professional malpractice, the court noted that Sorenson "cited no
Massachusetts statute or case that recognize[d] a professional malpractice
cause of action against a tax return preparer," and the court was
"disinclined... to invent one."
' 124
Turning to the breach of contract claim, Sorenson was finally
victorious, but in light of the damages awarded, the victory was very
Pyrrhic.
Since Sorenson was a long-time customer of Block, the court was
willing to treat representations made by Block regarding its accuracy in
return preparation and its confidential treatment of return information as
contractual obligations. 125  The jacket Sorenson received with his tax
returns after they were filed by Block12 6 contained these representations:
"[y]our return was carefully prepared and checked for accuracy," and "[a]ll
the information in your return will be kept completely confidential."'
' 27
Accordingly, while the three grounds alleged by Sorenson in the complaint
could have stated good causes of action for breach of contract, only one of
the three was ultimately upheld.
Regarding the claim for filing inaccurate tax returns, the court
determined that there was no valid cause of action against Block. Under
the facts, none of the inaccuracies resulted from errors by Block. The
deductions for charitable contributions (including the political expenses)
and excessive employee business expenses were clearly insisted upon by
Sorenson, despite many expressions of resistance by Block. Likewise, the
errors detected by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue audit-
122 The Tort claim was asserted in three counts in the complaint: a basic negligence claim
against Block and Brandenburg; a claim of negligent failure by Block to investigate/supervise;
and a claim of negligent failure by Block to train. Id. at *26.
123 Id. at *28-29.
124 Id. at *31.
125 Id. at *32.
126 The court realized that Sorenson's 1993 tax return was never returned to him so he never
received a jacket for this return. In light of Sorenson's long-standing relationship with Block and
his receipt of many such jackets prior to 1994, the court ignored this omission. Id. at *32, 32
n.10.
127 Id. at *31-32.
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misdesignation of the tax home and certain excessive deductions-were
likewise not Block errors. The evidence, according to the court, when
viewed in a light most favorable to Sorenson, showed that Block simply
failed to prevent Sorenson from submitting a tax return containing
inaccuracies that Sorenson himself was primarily responsible for.
Therefore, the court awarded Block summary judgment on this point. 128
Sorenson's claim for relief because of Block's report to the IRS of its
concerns about the return before it was filed was dealt with by the court
rather summarily on evidentiary grounds. Since the evidence left open the
material fact regarding whether Brandenberg was the source of the report,
the court decided the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment
and denied both parties' motions.
Sorenson was fully victorious and received summary judgment on his
third claim, that Block voluntarily provided the IRS with its internal
documents at the audit of his 1993 return. According to the court, this
clearly breached Block's contractual duty of confidentiality to Sorenson
and warranted summary judgment Sorenson. 29
Insofar as his damages were concerned, Sorenson was not very
fortunate. The bulk of the damages claimed apparently resulted from
emotional distress. Under Massachusetts law, the court held that a plaintiff
could not recover damages for emotional distress solely on contractual
grounds. While acknowledging that Massachusetts law sometimes made
an exception, the court held the exception was not applicable in the present
situation. Here, the public policy favoring disclosure of suspected tax
fraud to the IRS militated against the award of such damages. 30
Ultimately, the court awarded Sorenson only the preparation fee for his
1993 tax return, holding that there is never any basis to award a plaintiff
the amount of unpaid back taxes. These are the taxpayer's responsibility
irrespective of how they were discovered. 13' Though Massachusetts law
was silent, the court also decided not to award Sorenson interest or
penalties incurred. In the absence of a specific contractual undertaking to
pay such amounts,1 32 the court held it would follow the New York view in
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey,133 deeming it the majority
121 Id. at *37-38.
129 Id. at *41-42.
130 Id. at *43-44.
131 Id. at *45. This is consistent with the general view in such malpractice cases.
132 Block did contractually promise to pay interest and penalties resulting from an error by
Block in the preparation of a tax return. The court held that this undertaking did not apply to
Block's promise to keep returns confidential. Id. at *45-46.
133 160 A.D.2d 67, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dep't 1990).
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view,134 which denied interest recovery since such a recovery would give a
plaintiff the "windfall" of having both use of the money as well as the
interest. 135 The court similarly refused to award Sorenson attorney's fees
incurred in the audits and criminal investigation. 13
6
The court expressly noted that Sorenson was only entitled to the
preparation fee for his 1993 tax return, notwithstanding that Massachusetts
also audited his 1991 and 1992 returns, and the IRS also audited 1992,
1994 and 1995 returns. The breach of confidentiality occurred only with
respect to the 1993 return.
In connection with the court's damages award, several observations
are offered. Initially, it should be noted that typically in tax malpractice
situations, attorneys fees or fees paid to other professionals to fix or
attempt to fix the harm caused are recoverable.' 37 Second, while the court
decided it would not award interest and penalties as damages because it
would follow Alperti38 and not give plaintiffs a double benefit'39 -Alpert
applies only to interest, not to penalties. 140 There is no doubling up with
regard to penalties and such amounts could be recoverable.
It appears that the court treated Sorenson as an unsavory tax cheat to
whom it awarded as little as legally necessary and nothing more. In
addition, the damages awarded were strictly contract damages and not tort
damages, which can be more extensive. If Block had engaged in this
precise conduct, but with respect to a taxpayer who had legitimate
deductions, it would be hard to justify not awarding attorneys fees and
also, perhaps, damages caused in other audited years.
Before concluding its analysis, the court granted the defendants
summary judgment on Sorenson's allegations of intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress 4 ' and intentional and negligent
misrepresentation. 142 Essentially, the court held that the plaintiff failed to
prove the existence of any cognizable severe emotional distress. 143 Also,
to establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Massachusetts law, a defendant would have had to engage in
134 Sorenson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689, at *45-46 (citing Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v.
Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1996)).
"' Id. at *45-46.
136 Id. at *47-48.
137 See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 605.1.2; Todres, supra note 1, at 564-65.
138 See supra notes 133-35.
139 Sorenson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689, at *45-46.
140 Alpert, 160 A.D.2d 67, 70, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (1st Dep't 1990). The IRS did not
assess any penalty in Alpert.
141 Sorenson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689, at *51-57.
142 Id. at *57-58.
143 Id. at *52-58.
2004]
ST JOHN'S LA W RE VIE W
"'extreme and outrageous' conduct 'utterly intolerable in a civilized
community."",144 Raising "a 'hue and cry' regarding suspected tax fraud,"
according to the court, simply did not establish such conduct.
145
Sorenson did achieve another victory in the case, albeit a very
backhanded and almost fortuitous one. The court granted Block summary
judgment 146 with respect to most claims arising under the Massachusetts
Unfair Trade Practices Act,147 specifically holding that while Block's
actions may have been in breach of its contract of confidentiality, they
nevertheless were not "immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous" so
as to directly violate the Massachusetts law. 148 Nevertheless, the court
held Block violated that law by failing to disclose to Sorenson that it
breached its duty of confidentiality with respect to his 1993 tax return,
when it prepared his 1994 and 1995 tax returns. This omission deprived
Sorenson of the opportunity to consider other tax preparation services in
light of Block's violation of its duty of confidentially, and constituted an
unfair trade practice. 49 The court, therefore, granted Sorenson summary
judgment on this issue and awarded him the tax preparation fees for the
1994 and 1995 tax returns as damages. Since there is an important public
policy to encourage the reporting of tax misfeasance, the court declined to
award more than the minimum double damages under the law. 50  The
court, as was required, also awarded reasonable attorneys fees to Sorenson
in connection with the prosecution of this action.'
5
'
For all his trouble, in light of the fact that Sorenson was ultimately a
tax cheat, he recovered his tax preparation fees for 1993, double his tax
preparation fees for 1994 and 1995, and his attorney fees in this action. On
appeal, the First Circuit noted that the total damages awarded to Sorenson
were $630.152
2. Late Filing and Non-Filing
Failing to file a tax return on a timely basis has been said to comprise
"the vast majority of malpractice cases arising in the return preparation
'44 Id. at *53-54 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
145 Id. at *54 (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980)).
146 Id. at *59-60.
147 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2004).
141 Sorenson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689, at *60-61.
149 Id. at *61.
150 Id. at *61-62.
'' Id. at *62.
152 Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 03-2268, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17723, at *3 (1st
Cir. 2004).
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context."'1 53 For instance, in Haas Enterprises v. Davis,154 upon the death
of the taxpayer's accountant in 1995, it was discovered that no tax returns
were filed for the defendant's professional corporation since 1984.55 An
interesting example of failing to file a timely return occurred in Brott
Mordis & Co. v. Camp.'56 There, the plaintiff, Camp, had taxes withheld
from his pay for 1989, 1990, and 1991, but never filed any tax returns.
During July 1992, Camp hired the defendant accountants, Brott Mardis &
Co., to prepare his delinquent returns for the three years. However, instead
of providing Brott Mardis with all his tax information immediately, he
supplied this information piecemeal on an annual basis.157 Camp delivered
his 1991 tax information to Brott Mardis on April 7, 1995. The return was
mailed to the IRS on April 15, 1995 and received on April 18, 1995. The
refund claimed on the return was denied by the IRS as untimely. Camp
later filed this suit against Brott Mardis claiming negligence for failure to
timely file the return, which prevented recovery of his 1991 refund.
158
Interestingly, Camp received summary judgment in the trial court on
the assumption that the general three-year statute of limitations applied.
Under this theory, the last date to timely file his 1991 return was April 15,
1995, and Brott Mardis was negligent in failing to meet this deadline. 59 In
fact, the actual applicable statute of limitations was for two years' 60 and
had expired on April 15, 1994, almost one year before the 1991
information was turned over to the defendant. 161 On appeal, the trial
court's decision was reversed and the defendant was granted summary
judgment. 62
In Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust,163 an estate administrator's attorneys
prepared the estate's federal and state estate tax returns, and had a
memorandum in their files recognizing that certain deductions were
omitted on the original returns. Amended returns, however, were never
153 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 605.2.1.
154 82 P.3d 42 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
155 Id. at 43. The Haas Enterprises court addressed the procedural issue of when the statute
of limitations accrued.
156 768 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
151 Id. at 1192.
151 Id at 1192-93.
159 Id. at 1193. The trial court was utilizing the general statute of limitations which is three
years from the due date (April 15th of the next year) of the return. See I.R.C. § 65 11 (a) (2000).
160 Section 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that when a tax return is not filed, a
claim for refund must be filed within two years from when the tax is paid. I.R.C. § 6511(a),
(b)(1). Withheld income taxes are deemed paid on April 15 of the next year. I.R.C. § 6513(b).
161 Brott Mordis, 768 N.E.2d at 1192.
162 Id. at 1196.
163 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 93 P.3d 337 (Cal. 2004).
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filed to claim these deductions nor was an extension of time to file an
amended return sought.' 64 A subsequent executor for the estate brought
suit against the attorneys for malpractice. The intermediate appellate
court, affirming the trial court, held the executor lacked standing to sue the
attorneys for the previous administrator for malpractice since he had no
privity with the attorneys. 65 On appeal, the Supreme Court of California
reversed on the privity issue and remanded for further proceedings.166
Two recent cases involved suits against accountants for failing to
advise corporate taxpayers of their obligations to collect sales taxes and
file the required tax returns. In Inphoto Surveillance, Inc. v. Crowe,
Chizek & Co.,167 the taxpayer, an Illinois corporation which provided
surveillance services for the insurance industry, commenced providing
such services in New York in 1992. It inquired of the defendant
accountants whether it was obligated to collect sales taxes and file sales tax
returns in New York. It was erroneously advised that it need not, and in
1999, it paid New York approximately $500,000 as a condition for
entering into a voluntary disclosure program. 168
In CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A.,169 the taxpayer
was an Arizona corporation that provided photocopying services in various
states, expanding its business into California in 1982. Neither the
taxpayer's original accountant, who was employed from 1981 until late
1989 or early 1990, nor the successor ever advised the taxpayer to collect
California sales tax and, presumably, to file the required tax returns. 17° In
1996, California assessed $3.2 million against the taxpayer for unpaid




While both situations seem to present potentially viable tax
malpractice claims, neither court addressed the substance of the claims,
focusing instead on statute of limitations issues in the context of either a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. 172
6 Id. at 141.
165 Id. at 146.
166 93 P.3d 337 (Cal. 2004), rev'g, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 2002).
167 788 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
168 Id. at 217.
169 7 P.3d 979, 980 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
170 Id. at 980.
... Id. at 981.
172 In Inphoto Surveillance, the trial court had dismissed the defendant's motion to dismiss
on statute of limitations grounds and certified for review the question whether an exception to the
accountant's statute of repose that refers to "income tax assessments" also applied to sales tax
assessment. 788 N.E.2d at 216. The court held it did not. Id. at 219. In CDT, the Court of
Appeals of Arizona reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant on statute of limitation
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One additional case deserves mention. If there were ever a
"Chutzpah 173 of the Year" award, the defendant attorney in the following
case would win hands down. In Leasequip, Inc. v. Dapeer,174 the
defendant-attorney had represented or, pdrhaps more accurately,
misrepresented, the plaintiff in a number of matters for which he faced
many potential malpractice claims. 175 In 1994, he advised the plaintiff not
to file corporate tax returns since Bank of America refused to furnish an
accounting of monies it had extended or received on behalf of the plaintiff.
In addition, the defendant advised the plaintiff not to observe any normal
corporate formalities, including the filing of a statement of information
with California, which resulted in suspension of the plaintiffs corporate
powers by the California Secretary of State. The defendant advised the
plaintiff periodically between 1994 and 1999 that failure to observe these
"mere formalities" was easily curable without affecting the corporation's
business or legal claims.' 76  The court found that the defendant's true
motive in rendering this advice was to make it legally impossible for the
plaintiff to pursue any of its potential malpractice claims against the
defendant.1
77
On July 16, 1998, the plaintiffs corporate powers were suspended for
failing to file the required statement of information. When the plaintiff
brought suit for malpractice on October 22, 1998, the defendant
successfully dismissed the initial complaint, presumably on the basis of
plaintiff's suspended corporate powers. With respect to a subsequent
complaint, the defendant argued that by the time the plaintiffs suspended
corporate powers had been revived in September 1999, the statute of
limitations had expired on most of the malpractice claims.
7 8
Fortunately for the American legal system, the California Court of
Appeals held that the defendant attorney was equitably estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to most of the alleged
malpractice claims. 1
79
grounds. CDT, 7 P.3d at 980.
173 The classic modem definition of chutzpah is when one who has killed both his parents
throws himself at the mercy of the court because he is an orphan. LEO ROSTEN, THE JOYS OF
YIDDISH 93 (1958).
114 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
171 Id. at 784-85.
176 Id. at 784.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 785-86.
179 Id. at 792. As a footnote to the defendant attorney's rightful entitlement to the
"Chutzpah of the Year" award, it should be noted that during the pendancy of this action he filed
a separate suit against the plaintiff for over $400,000 of unpaid legal fees in the underlying
(mis)representations which were at the heart of this case. Id. at 786.
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3. Negligent Preparation
This section will focus on errors involving the return preparation
process. There are cases that simply assert malpractice occurred in the
preparation of a tax return without specifying the underlying facts or
without specifying them in any useful detail.1 80 These cases often arise in
the context of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment and,
by and large, are ignored herein. Cases that result from the misapplication
of a specific tax code provision, deduction, or tax concept will be
addressed subsequently in this article.
There are some points in the following two cases that make them
worthy of mention, even though these cases fail to specify the underlying
preparation problem in enough detail. The first case, Noel v. Hoover,'81
involved an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of a complaint against
an accountant as barred by the statute of limitations. Allegedly, the
accountant incorrectly reported a stock transfer on the taxpayer's 1990 tax
return.1 82  Of note, the return not only resulted in proposed additional
taxes, but in an IRS recommendation of criminal prosecution based on the
willful signing of a fraudulent tax return. 8 3 The amounts involved were
substantial, 184 but unfortunately, the opinion provided no additional details
about the actual tax return.
In the second of these cases, Avakian v. Ohanessian,185 one of two
former partners appealed a grant of summary judgment on statute of
limitation grounds to the now dissolved partnership's accountant. The
malpractice action alleged that the accountant refused to deduct the salaries
paid to most of the partnership's employees. The defendant-accountant
claimed that the workers did not file income tax returns, some of the
workers were working illegally, and the partnership did not pay payroll
taxes and other employer contributions on behalf of those employees.'
86
Isn't this a situation likely to be encountered by many accountants who
represent small businesses? The moral of Avakian is to approach such
"' See, e.g., KPMG, L.L.P. v. Carmel Fin. Corp., 784 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
Caron v. Smith, No. CV-03-213, 2004 Me. Super. LEXIS 36, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 3,
2004); Alvarado v. H&R Block, Inc., 24 S.W.3d (Mo. 2000).
"' 12 P.3d 328 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
182 Id. at 329.
183 Id.
184 See id. The notice of deficiency demanded an additional $815,589 in taxes plus
$611,692 in fraud penalties. See id. After a trial in tax court, the additional tax owed was
determined to be $488,718 with no liability for any penalties. See id.
185 No. B 150367, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9275 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2002).
186 Id. at *4.
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situations very carefully and thoughtfully-especially where the business
has multiple owners.
An interesting additional sidenote to Avakian is the claim that the
negligently prepared tax return caused the other partner to dissolve the
partnership, which, among other things, caused the plaintiff to incur legal
expenses. Whether such damages could be recovered in an appropriate
case is most intriguing.
In Crowe, Chizek & Co. v. Oil Technology, Inc.,188 the defendant-
accountants had prepared the plaintiff corporation's Indiana personal
property tax returns from 1987 through 1992. On each of the returns, the
defendant accountants had failed to claim an exemption for industrial
waste control facilities to which the taxpayer was entitled. As a result, the
taxpayer overpaid its personal property taxes by approximately
$168,000.189 On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the
relevant statute of limitations barred the prosecution of this action. 190
McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse L.L.P.191 involved a suit against an
accounting firm and an accountant involved in the preparation of estate tax
returns. Although the precise errors made by the accountants were not
clearly detailed in the opinion, the plaintiff claimed that the returns were
not up to acceptable standards of quality, were filed late, were not accepted
as filed by the IRS and state authorities, and there was either failure to
disclose, or misrepresentation about, whether the returns were accepted as
filed. 192 Both sides appealed the jury verdict, and the appellate court
addressed two noteworthy damages issues. First, after reviewing the split
among the other states concerning recovery of interest assessed against a
plaintiff in addition to taxes, the court in McCulloch concluded that such
interest may be recoverable in Oregon. 193 The court reasoned that there
would not necessarily be a double recovery-use of the money plus
interest-since such a windfall depends on the financial condition of the
plaintiff. Where the plaintiff does not have money available to invest,
clearly there will be no double benefit. Similarly, the court did not believe
that the nature of the causation of such damages was too speculative to be
recoverable. This, according to the court, was within the realm of
decisions courts in Oregon have always dealt with.
194
187 id. at *13.
188 771 N.E.2d 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
189 See id. at 1205.
190 Id. at 1211.
191 971 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
192 Seeid. at419.
193 Id. at418-19.
194 Id. at 419.
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The second damages issue addressed by McCulloch was whether
damages for emotional distress were recoverable in such malpractice cases.
Considering that the underlying injury involved in malpractice cases is
purely economic, the court held that no recovery was available for
emotional distress under Oregon law.1 9
5
In King v. Neal,196 the defendant tax attorney prepared the plaintiffs'
1991 income tax return. During 1991, the plaintiffs settled a multi-year
dispute with a bank. On their 1991 tax return, the defendant deducted a
loss that he concluded was sustained when the dispute was settled,
including legal fees and other expenses that had been paid prior to that
year. A later audit determined that the plaintiffs could not take these
deductions in 1991. However, by then it was too late to file amended
returns and claim the deductions in the proper earlier years.' 97 The suit
against the defendant followed, and a jury awarded plaintiffs damages. On
appeal, the major issue was whether the award was excessive. 98
The damages awarded below consisted of the amounts paid by
plaintiffs for additional taxes, penalties, interest and other expenses
incurred as a result of the audit (i.e., professional services and
representation during the audit), and the fee paid for preparation of the
1991 return. 99 In addition, though the jury did not award any punitive
damages, they were instructed about, and presumably considered, them.2 °°
On appeal, the major issue was whether the additional tax incurred by
plaintiffs could properly be awarded as damages.20'
Without much difficulty, the court in King held that it was proper to
include in damages the additional tax incurred by the plaintiffs. The
governing Oklahoma statute provided that the measure of damages was
"the amount which will compensate for all detriment proximately
caused... whether it could have been anticipated or not., 20 2  And,
according to the court, it was for the jury to decide whether, and how
much, to award.20 3 Interestingly, in its analysis, the court cited only one
case from the federal district court in Louisiana as authority, without any
real discussion.0 4 Similarly, and again without much discussion, the court
195 Id. at 421-22.
196 19 P.3d 899 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
197 Id. at 900.
'9' Id. at 900-01.
199 Id. at 900, 902.
200 See id at 900.
201 Id. at 901.
202 Id. at 902 (emphasis omitted) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 61 (1991)).
203 Id.




distinguished another Louisiana federal district court case relied upon by
the defendant.2 5
It should be noted that the measure of damages for the additional
taxes utilized in King might be incorrect. If the claimed amounts should
have been deducted in years prior to 1991, the real loss to the taxpayer
would seem to this author to be the value of the foregone tax savings in the
proper earlier years. By omitting these deductions from 1991, the correct
tax for 1991 was determined. The amount of incorrectly inflated 1991
deductions seems irrelevant to the plaintiffs actual damages. Perhaps the
court below simply assumed the 1991 amount was an acceptable
approximation of the actual earlier losses.
One final interesting point is mentioned, but seemingly not addressed,
in King. In affirming that the jury could consider the additional 1991 taxes
in determining damages, the court noted that the plaintiffs had testified that
"the timing of the additional taxes, interest, and penalties produced an
added financial burden that contributed to their filing bankruptcy., 2 0 6 It is
not clear from the opinion whether the plaintiffs' bankruptcy was, or could
have been, an element of the damages awarded by the jury. Would
damages caused by a bankruptcy filing, if connected to or resulting from
some tax malpractice, be an element of recoverable damages, or would
they be too remote?
Cleveland v. Rotman20 7 is fascinating, both from its unusual factual
setting as well as the court's ultimate holding that suicide is not a
foreseeable consequence of bad tax advice. Mr. Cleveland, an attorney,
was involved in a fifteen-year tax dispute with the IRS, resulting in
numerous trials and appeals. Mr. Cleveland lost all his assets; the IRS
even took Cleveland's social security income in the early 1990s; he was
disbarred from practicing law; and he went into debt due to the legal bills,
interest, and penalties. As a result, Mr. Cleveland suffered severe
depression and became suicidal. In 1996, he retained the defendant-
attorney for advice in resolving his dispute with the IRS, and the defendant
advised Mr. Cleveland to file tax returns for a ten-year period. Mr.
Cleveland claimed he was unable to calculate his income and expenses for
this period because he lost his financial records in office moves and
205 Id. (distinguishing Gantt v. Boone, Wellford, Clark, Langschmidt & Pemberton, 559 F.
Supp. 1219 (M.D. La. 1983), on its facts because, there, tax advice was not sought from the
defendant accountant and as a result, he was not liable for malpractice).
206 Id. at 902.
207 297 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2002).
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divorce proceedings. The defendant advised him to estimate his income
and expenses for those ten years.208
As it turned out, Mr. Cleveland's estimates did not match the IRS
figures. The IRS decided to audit him again, despite having previously
declared his account uncollectible. The audit was originally scheduled for
February 1997, but was postponed until January 1998 after the intervention
of Mr. Cleveland's therapist who was concerned over his suicidal
tendencies. Mr. Cleveland committed suicide shortly before the audit was
scheduled to take place.20 9
Mr. Cleveland's widow, his second wife,210 instituted a suit on her
own behalf and as the executrix of Mr. Cleveland's estate to recover due to
Mr. Cleveland's suicide. The claim, insofar as it related to the attorney,2 1
alleged that the attorney's advice was flawed because he did not obtain the
relevant financial information from the IRS, and told Mr. Cleveland to
"guess" at the relevant information for the ten years.2t 2 Seemingly, the
plaintiff claimed that the flawed advice caused the IRS audit, which, in
turn, caused Mr. Cleveland's suicide.213
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint for failing to state a cause of action.21 4 Though several other
issues were also involved, the heart of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning was
the lack of proximate cause. "[S]uicide is generally not a likely result of
bad tax advice, especially when that advice concerns the relatively routine
matter of filing tax returns. 21 5
4. Miscellaneous-Paying Tax
Leffler v. Mills216 is a reminder that failing to pay tax timely may also
result in a malpractice award. In Leffler, defendant attorney was hired to
probate a decedent's estate. Though the federal estate tax return was
timely filed, he did not timely pay the federal estate tax, resulting in
interest and penalties of over $135,000. The trial court granted the
201 Id. at 571.
209 Id. at 571-72.
210 Id. at 571.
211 The suit was also brought against the IRS and an IRS officer, but they were not involved
in these proceedings. Id. at 571.
212 See Cleveland v. United States, No. 00-C-424, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908, at *3-4
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2000), aff'd, 297 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit's opinion is
not very clear on this point. The district court's opinion is more enlightening.
213 See id. at *4-5.
214 Cleveland, 297 F.3d at 575.
215 Id. at 573.
"' 285 A.D.2d 774, 729 N.Y.S.2d 196 (3d Dep't 2001).
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plaintiff summary judgment and awarded this amount as damages. 217
Though this judgment was reversed on appeal because of statute of
limitation issues, 218 the damages award likely would have been upheld
absent such issues.
C. Taxpayer Representation Before IRS and Courts
In Malpractice I, a number of cases were discussed in which various
litigation-related failings by tax practitioners were the basis for malpractice
suits. 219 Such failings occurred in the course of representation before the
IRS or in court.22° Since Malpractice I, there were two cases that allege
such failings in representing clients before the IRS, but neither explored
the underlying facts with meaningful specificity. In Tony Smith Trucking
v. Woods & Woods, Ltd.,22 1 a general allegation claimed that the plaintiffs'
accountant failed to exercise the skill and workmanship required by those
in the accounting profession with respect to the defense of audits of
plaintiffs' income tax returns.222 This is augmented by the further general
claim that the accountant failed to make appropriate arguments or supply
223 224appropriate documentation. In Alvarado v. H&R Block, Inc., in
addition to a general allegation that defendant negligently prepared the
plaintiffs' tax returns, there were allegations that the defendant failed to
appear for previously scheduled meetings with the IRS and that an IRS
Notice of Deficiency-Waiver form was signed without plaintiffs'
authorization.225 In each case, various statute of limitations issues were the
focus of the opinion.
Tony Smith Trucking does focus on an interesting issue. The court
considered whether Arkansas's three-year tort statute of limitations, or its
five-year contract statute of limitations, was applicable.2 6 In an attempt to
employ the longer contract statute of limitations, the plaintiffs alleged that
a contract was formed when their accountant signed the IRS's power of
attorney form to represent them at audit. This, plaintiffs claimed,
constituted a contract that was breached by the subsequent deficient
217 Id. at 775, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
211 See id at 777, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
219 See Todres, supra note 1, at 574-82.
220 Id.
22' 55 S.W.3d 327 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
222 Id. at 328.
223 Id. at 329.
224 24 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
225 Id. at 239.
226 Tony Smith Trucking, 55 S.W.3d at 329-30.
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representation.22 7 The court refused to accept this argument and held that
to constitute a valid contract, there must be a specific promise or
undertaking. If the asserted breach is of the general duty to act diligently,
this was simply nothing more than an allegation of negligence. The power
of attorney, at most, represents a general duty of the attorney to represent
diligently; it does not contain any specific promises and therefore does not
rise to the level of a contract.
228
Frederick Road Limited Partnership v. Brown & Sturm2 29 indicated
that failing to object to the admissibility of evidence at trial can create the
basis for a malpractice suit.2 30  The facts of Frederick Road Limited
Partnership are quite involved.23 1 The case arose from estate planning of
decedents, Mr. and Mrs. King. At the heart of the matter, the Kings sought
to minimize the potential estate and gift taxes to be incurred on the transfer
of their farm to their children. The King's accountant believed the farm
was worth between $20 and $100 million,232 but a local real estate
attorney, Brown, believed that a much lower value could be placed on the
land if a "farm-use only" valuation could be utilized. To justify such a
valuation, Brown proposed that the Kings place a three-year "farm-use
only" easement on the property.233  Several farm-use only appraisals
valued the farm at between $515,000 and $720,000.234 When the Kings
discussed Brown's plan with their long-time attorney, Wolf, a partner at
Piper & Marbury, he strongly disagreed with Brown's plan, calling it
"badly flawed., 235 He believed the farm had to be valued at its "highest
and best use" and that it was worth much more than the "farm-use only"
valuation.2 36
The Kings decided to follow Brown's plan and subsequently sold
most of the farm for almost $597,000 to two limited partnerships created
by their children. Following Wolf s discharge as the Kings' attorney, he
wrote a letter to Mr. King, with a copy to Brown, expressing his concern
about the potential tax consequences of the transaction. The letter
explained that he believed the farm was worth between $27 and $54.4
million and that substantial additional transfer taxes would be incurred.237
227 Id.
221 Id at 330-31.
229 756 A.2d 963 (Md. 2000).
230 Id at 969.
231 See discussion infra Part II.D.2.d.
232 Frederick Road Ltd. P'ship, 756 A.2d at 965.
233 Id. at 965-66.
234 Id.
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Several years later, after the Kings' death, the IRS investigated the
transaction and issued a deficiency assessment of over $68 million in
additional taxes and penalties. After Brown's repeated reassurances to the
King family that the original transaction was valid and would be upheld,
the asserted deficiency was litigated in the Tax Court. Two weeks before
the scheduled trial, Brown advised the King children to settle the case for
$20 million in taxes and penalties. Brown's sole reason for this advice was
that the IRS files contained a copy of Wolf s letter, which Brown believed
compromised all his defenses.238 The King children took Brown's advice
and settled for $20 million.
Still not admitting his plan was flawed, Brown convinced the King
children to institute a legal malpractice suit against Wolf and his law firm
to recover the $20 million. Brown argued that the release to the IRS of
Wolf s letter by either Wolf or his law firm violated the attorney-client
privilege and was the direct and proximate cause of the $20 million 1oss.239
The malpractice suit was terminated when the trial judge granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment,240 which strongly suggested
that Brown caused the King children's damages by his bad advice and
failure to object to the admissibility of Wolf s letter before in the Tax
Court.2 4' The trial judge indicated that Brown could have prevented
Wolf s letter from ever coming into evidence "by the slightest exertion of
effort."
2 42
Unfortunately, the court in Frederick Road Limited Partnership never
addressed the substance of Brown's liability. It merely held that the courts
below erred in granting Brown summary judgment and then reversed and
remanded for trial.243
In Lewis v. Edwards,24 a doctor with eight felony tax violation
convictions sued her attorney in the criminal trial for tax malpractice,
asserting that the attorney negligently represented her in the criminal
matter. The court, almost summarily, held that in Virginia a plaintiff may
not recover unless her convictions were set aside or resolved in her favor
as a result of some post-conviction relief granted by a court. Innocence
and post-conviction relief are elements of the tort cause of action and it
238 Id. at 968.
239 Id. at 969.
240 Id. The summary judgment order was affirmed on appeal. Id.
241 id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 986.
244 54 Va. Cir. 257 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
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was against Virginia's public policy to allow anyone to receive monetary
gain as a result of a crime.245
Alampi v. Russo2 46 involved a similar situation. The plaintiff, an
accountant, pled guilty to a misdemeanor for failing to supply information
in connection with an IRS investigation.2 47 There too, the plaintiff asserted
negligent misrepresentation in the criminal matter, and argued that with
more skillful representation, he would have received a better result. 248 The
trial judge granted the defendant summary judgment, holding that there
was no genuine issue of material fact and that New Jersey "public policy
precluded this [type of] action. 2 49 The appellate court affirmed, holding
that the integrity of federal guilty pleas would be undermined if such
malpractice suits were permitted where, such as in the present case, the
judge carefully determined the existence of a factual basis for the plea
before accepting it. Thus, it was against public policy to permit such a
malpractice suit.2 Noting that "whether an unimpeached guilty plea in a
criminal proceeding bars recovery in a legal malpractice action" was novel
in New Jersey,2 5' the court declined to reach the question of whether
exoneration from a criminal conviction was always necessary before such
252
a case could reach a jury.
Ang v. Martin253 held that a defendant in a criminal trial must prove
actual innocence of the charged crime, not merely acquittal in the criminal
trial, in order to succeed on a claim of legal malpractice allegedly
occurring during the criminal trial.2 54 The plaintiffs in Ang were tried on
several criminal charges, including tax fraud. They reluctantly accepted a
plea agreement worked out by their attorneys, but after consulting with
new counsel, withdrew their guilty pleas and were ultimately acquitted
after trial. 5 Subsequently, they instituted this action for legal malpractice
against their original attorneys. The Washington Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the malpractice claim because the
plaintiffs could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they
256
were not guilty of the underlying crimes.
245 See id. at 257-58.
246 785 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
247 Id. at 66.
248 Id. at 69.
249 Id. at 66-67.
250 See id. at 72-80.
251 Id. at 70.
252 Id. at 72.
253 76 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
254 Id. at 790.
255 Id. at 789.
256 Id
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D. Personal Tax Planning
1. Income Tax
a. In General
Before examining more specific types of potential tax malpractice, I
will discuss three cases that do not lend themselves to more precise
categorization. The first, Streber v. Hunter,257 involved a combination of
bad advice about how to report a transaction and bad advice not to settle
the controversy with the IRS on favorable terms. The second case, Ronson
v. Talesnick,58 involved erroneous advice concerning the amount of
money that needed to be deposited with the IRS in order to stop the
running of interest. The third case, Donahue's Accounting & Tax Service,
S.C. v. Ryno,2 59 alleged a failure to file for innocent spouse status before
filing a tax return.
Streber claimed egregious misconduct by an attorney, not just with
respect to tax matters, but with respect to a series of litigations among
family members that the court, with charitable understatement, referred to
as "less-than-amicable., 260 The tax malpractice matter concerned advice
on how to report the disposition of interests in a joint venture received by
two young and financially unsophisticated sisters. The sisters' father,
Larry Parker, discovered available undeveloped land in a potentially
lucrative residential area. Not having the funds to purchase the land
himself, Parker put all the pieces together and got a friend of his to
purchase the land as part of a joint venture. For his work in putting the
deal together, Parker was to receive a portion of the venture's initial
profits, and additionally, a large portion of the venture's equity interest
was to be placed in trust for his two young daughters, who were then
around sixteen and eleven years old.261  The equity interest was
immediately transferred in trust for the daughters in 1979, and in 1981, the
venture sold the property and each of the sisters received $2 million in
promissory notes for their interest. In 1982, when the sisters were nineteen
and fourteen, respectively, the trustee endorsed the notes and gave both of
them to the older sister. In 1985, each sister received $1.7 million and a lot
257 221 F.3d 701, 717 (5th Cir. 2000).
258 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 351 (D.N.J. 1999).
259 674 N.W.2d 681, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1167 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.17, 2003).
260 Streber, 221 F.3d at 714.
261 Id. at 712.
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in the property subdivision in payment of the notes. 262 At issue was the
proper tax reporting of the sales proceeds received by the sisters.
By 1985, the sisters were no longer communicating with their father.
He had become "infuriated" with them when they refused to invest their
proceeds from the notes in his company. Before the fallout, however,
Parker advised the older daughter to pay capital gains taxes. The sisters
therefore sought tax advice and ultimately retained the defendant attorney,
Hunter.263
Hunter, after "briefly examining a few documents," and without
doing any research, advised the sisters they had three options:
(1) pay no taxes and hope the IRS did not find out about [it] .... (2) treat
the transaction as a 1981 gift and pay capital gains taxes on the income
received in 1985, or (3) treat the transaction as a 1985 gift, in which case
Parker would be liable for gift tax and they would be liable for
nothing.
264
Though option two was clearly the correct one, Hunter urged the
sisters to select the third option, insisting that option two would somehow
arouse IRS suspicions.
265
In 1986, Parker's attorney wrote to Hunter expressing his belief that
the documents indicated that the gift was made at the inception of the joint
venture, not in 1985, and offered to let Hunter examine the documents.
Hunter refused.266
In 1991, the IRS issued notices of deficiency against both sisters and
Parker.26 7 Two years later, there was mediation between the sisters,
Parker, and the IRS. The trial court found that the IRS would have settled
for between $1 and $1.2 million from the sisters. Furthermore, the
mediator, a former judge, and Parker's attorney each told the sisters that
they would likely lose at trial, and that even if they won, they would
nevertheless "'lose' because they would probably be liable for [Parker's]
higher gift tax via transferee liability., 268  Based on the defendant's
reassurance that they would win and that transferee liability was dubious,
162 Id. at 712-13.
263 Id. at 713.
264 Id. Presumably, option three would also create an income tax liability for Parker on the
receipt of the $1.7 million and the lot.
265 See id. at 713-14. In a related tax case the court indicated Hunter "affirmatively
advise[d] and vigorously assist[ed]" the sisters in selecting option three. See id. at 714
(alterations in original) (quoting Streber v. Commissioner, 138 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 1998)).
266 Id. at 714-15.
267 Id. at 715.
261 Id. at 715-16. Transferee liability allows the IRS to collect gift taxes from the donee
even though liability for the tax is imposed upon the donor. See I.R.C. §§ 2502(c), 6901 (2000).
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the sisters refused to settle. 26 9 After the trial, the Tax Court held the sisters
liable for the capital gains tax and interest, and imposed penalties for
negligence and "substantial underestimation." However, the penalties
were reversed on appeal.
270
The present suit against Hunter was instituted, and, after a jury trial,
the sisters were awarded over $2.17 million in damages. The bulk of these
damages constituted the difference between the interest charged by the IRS
for the sister's late payment of the taxes due and the amount of interest
actually earned by the sisters while they had possession of the money.27I
The sisters also received compensation for the time they had spent trying
to rectify the harm caused by the defendant.272
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, though it did modify the damages awarded. Initially, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the $97,500 in damages awarded for the time spent by the
sisters in attempting to remedy the situation. The Fifth Circuit found that
at the charge conference, the trial judge threw out this element of damages.
Nevertheless, inexplicably, it appeared in the judge's copy of the jury
charge. This was inadvertent, and the amount awarded by the jury should
not have been entered as part of the judgment below. The Fifth Circuit
therefore vacated this particular award.273
With respect to the interest differential award, the Fifth Circuit
274recognized this as a question of first impression, and noted the existing
split in the courts over whether such interest on tax is recoverable in claims
of accountant malpractice.275 The Fifth Circuit noted that courts that do
not award such interest reason that a double recovery would result from
such an award: the plaintiff would have the benefit of the use of money
for a period of time, and then be reimbursed for the interest charged by the
IRS for that time. The courts that allow recovery do so, according to the
Fifth Circuit, to "make the plaintiff whole. 2 76
269 Streber, 221 F.3d at 716.
270 Id. at 716-17.
271 Id. at 717.
272 Id. Later in the opinion it was disclosed that one sister, Terry, was to receive $97,500 for
these "actual damages." See id. at 733. The sisters were also awarded substantial additional
damages under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Id. at 717. However, the Fifth
Circuit reversed this award on the procedural ground that the jury did not separate the actual and
punitive portions of the DTPA award. See id. at 730-32. Accordingly, it is not discussed herein.
273 Id. at 733-34.
274 Id. at 734.
275 Id. The court also noted that such interest is not awarded as "'actual damages' available
for securities fraud claims under Rule lob-5." Id. at 734, 734 n.46 (citations omitted); Todres,
supra note 1, at 636.
276 Streber, 221 F.3d at 734; see Todres, supra note 1, at 565; see also Caroline Rule, What
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Based on Texas law, which awards a plaintiff an amount of damages
designed to make her or him whole, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the interest
differential award.277 The Fifth Circuit held this was not a double recovery
because it only provided the difference between what the taxpayer paid the
IRS for use of the money and the actual interest earned by the taxpayer
from such money. It simply prevented the taxpayer from being "penalized
for conservative investing., 278 Such damages were easily within the realm
of foreseeable damages as required by Texas law. Defendant Hunter knew
the sisters intended to invest their money conservatively, 279 and the sisters
proved the amount of their earnings with great precision.28 °
There is one troubling aspect of the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the
interest differential award. The court, as did the district court below, 281
repeatedly referred to the amount of interest on the $1.7 million.282 The
facts, however, indicated that upon the sale of their share in the venture,
each sister received $1.7 million and a lot in the subdivision.283 According
to the Tax Court, the tax deficiency asserted by the IRS against each sister
was approximately $365,000.284 The interest charged by the IRS would be
based on the additional tax owed, not the full proceeds.285 Why the Fifth
Circuit and the trial court applied the interest differential to $1.7 million is
puzzling.
In Ronson v. Talesnick,286 during 1980 through 1983 the plaintiff
taxpayer had invested in tax shelter partnerships and claimed losses from
the partnerships on his tax returns. Subsequently, the IRS began
questioning the deductibility of losses from these partnerships. In mid-
1986, the taxpayer sought advice from the defendant accountant on how to
stop the accrual of interest on the amount that would be owed to the IRS if
these losses were disallowed. The accountant advised the taxpayer to
forward a cash bond to the IRS for $91,300, which the taxpayer did on
and When Can A Taxpayer Recover From a Negligent Tax Advisor?, 92 J. TAX'N 176, 176
(2000) (noting how a "New York taxpayer is not permitted to recover from her accountant
interest she owes on an underpayment of tax resulting from the accountant's faulty advice...
[whereas] a taxpayer in Illinois will be permitted to recover interest").
277 Streber, 221 F.3d at 734-35.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 735.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 717.
282 Id. at 734-35.
283 Id. at712.
284 Streber v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1604, 1605 (1995), rev'd, 138 F.3d 216 (5th
Cir. 1998).
285 See I.R.C. § 6601(a) (2000).
286 33 F. Supp. 2d 347 (D.N.J. 1999).
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June 30, 1986.287 In 1996, the IRS audited the taxpayer and it was
determined that the cash bond was too low and interest of approximately
$235,000 was owed.288  This suit ensued, seeking to collect from the
accountant the additional interest owed by the taxpayer.
The relevant issue in Ronson involved the defendant's motion for
summary judgment dismissing the action because the plaintiff could not
establish any damages. Plaintiff only claimed as damages the interest
owed the IRS and, according to the defendant, such interest may never be
awarded as damages.289 In Ronson, the court determined that New Jersey
law applied,2 90 and that New Jersey had no law on point.291 The court
therefore had to determine how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule
on the issue.
Recognizing the split among various jurisdictions on this issue,292 the
court held that New Jersey public policy necessitated that a tortfeasor
should not benefit from the ingenuity of a harmed plaintiff, and that such
interest be recoverable as damages.293 According to the court, prohibiting
a recovery of interest from a negligent accountant:
[P]ermits the tortfeasor to benefit from the presumption that a harmed
taxpayer has been or should have been ingenious enough to (1) maintain
a sum of money that he would have otherwise had to pay over to the IRS
and (2) invest that money in a manner in which he earned interest in an
amount comparable to the interest rate charged by the IRS.
29 4
Although Ronson was viewed by Streber as simply adopting the view
that interest may be recovered as damages in accountant malpractice
cases,295 Ronson is actually much more circumscribed. New Jersey
follows a benefit rule that, "where a wrong creates a benefit that would not
have existed but for the wrong, the damages flowing from the wrong are
offset to the extent of the benefit received., 296 Under this rule, the court
concluded that the defendant may present evidence of a benefit from the
malpractice that could lessen the plaintiffs recovery.297 Thus, where a
plaintiff earned some interest from the tax underpayment, but less than the
287 Id. at 349-50.
288 Id. at 350.
289 Id at 351.
290 Id. at 351-52.
291 Id. at 352.
292 Id. at 352-53.
293 Id. at 355.
294 Id.
295 Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734, 734 n.47 (5th Cir. 2000).
296 33 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (quoting Gracia v. Meiselman, 531 A.2d 1373 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987)).
297 Id. at 355.
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amount charged by the IRS, the recoverable damages would be remarkably
close to, if not identical with, Streber's interest differential approach.
Further, the particular facts in Ronson were not the run-of-the-mill
accountant malpractice damages in which, due to the accountant's
negligence, the taxpayer owed additional taxes plus interest. Here, the
taxpayer specifically sought advice on how to stop the running of interest.
If the accountant had done his job diligently, there would be no amount
owed to the IRS at all.298
In Donahue's Accounting & Tax Service, S.C. v. Ryno,299 the plaintiff
accountant sued his client to recover tax return preparation fees. The client
counterclaimed, seeking to recover her federal and state refunds for 1999,
which were kept by the respective taxing authorities and applied to taxes
owed by her former husband.30 0  The plaintiff asserted malpractice
occurred when her accountant filed tax returns before first filing a request
for "innocent spouse" status. 30 1 The trial court's judgment 30 2 in favor of
the plaintiff was reversed on appeal because she did not introduce any
expert testimony on the standard of care owed by an accountant. This
standard of care, according to the court, was beyond common knowledge
and comprehension and could only be established by expert testimony.30 3
The court noted, "It is obvious to this court that the [Internal Revenue
Code] is incomprehensible without the assistance of a qualified expert in
tax law.
304
b. Long-Term Capital Gains
Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah, L.L.P. 305 presented a classic textbook
situation of malpractice where a taxpayer lost long-term capital gains
treatment that could have been available with proper planning. The
plaintiff obtained over 700,000 shares in his employer on April 1, 1999. In
298 Id. at 350, 355. Interestingly, the district court could have simply held that interest
should be awarded as damages in Ronson in light of its unique facts, without deciding that New
Jersey would hold that interest is normally recoverable in accountant malpractice cases.
299 674 N.W.2d 681, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1167 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2003).
300 Id. at *2, 5-6.
301 Id. at *5-6. Normally, each spouse is jointly and severally liable for the tax on a joint
return. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2000). In certain instances, where an understatement of tax is due to
erroneous items of one spouse of which the other was unaware and had no reason to know, the
other "innocent" spouse might avoid liability. IRC § 6015(b).
302 It is interesting to observe that the suit was brought as a small claims action under WiS.
STAT. § 799.209 (2003), and yet an appeal was available. Donahue's Accounting, 2003 Wisc.
App. LEXIS 1167, at *2-3, 3 n.3.
303 Id. at *8-9.
304 Id. at *6-7.
... No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 461 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002).
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late 1999, a large publicly held corporation entered into negotiations to
acquire his employer. The purchaser insisted on obtaining all the shares of
the employer, including the plaintiffs 700,000 shares.30 6 Realizing he had
not yet held the stock long enough to qualify for favorable long-term
capital gains treatment,0 7 the plaintiff retained the defendant law firm,
Gadsby Hannah, and its of-counsel, Fineberg, to secure long-term capital
gains treatment. 30 8 While long-term treatment was achievable, the plaintiff
sold the shares several days too early due to Fineberg's negligence and
affirmative misfeasance. 30 9 This suit to recover damages ensued. Since
Fineberg persistently failed to appear for his deposition, a default order
was entered against him. 310 This action, in addition to deciding whether
causation was established under Massachusetts law, was an assessment of
311damages.
Pytka held that the plaintiff could recover as actual damages from the
defendant the difference between the actual federal and Massachusetts
state short-term capital gains taxes incurred ($656,836), and the amount
that would have been incurred if long term capital gains treatment had
been achieved ($372,368), amounting to $284,468. The plaintiff was also
entitled to recover the $22,000 in legal fees paid to the defendant. In
addition, under Massachusetts' Deceptive Trade Practices Act 312 the court
awarded plaintiff double the actual damages plus attorney's fees and costs
in the present action.
3 13
To determine actual damages, the plaintiff argued that the judgment
should be grossed-up (i.e., increased) because the judgment itself would be
subject to income tax. Therefore, he argued, the judgment should be
increased by an amount adequate to insure that the net remaining after tax
is equal to the damages suffered by the plaintiff.314 It is noteworthy that
the court specifically declined to add a gross up,315 though it is unclear if
306 Id. at *3-4.
307 Under I.R.C. § 1(h) (2000) (current version at I.R.C. § 1(h) (Supp. III 2003)), as in effect
during 2000, the maximum rate of tax on gain from the sale of stock held long term was 20
percent while the maximum rate of tax on ordinary income, including short-term capital gains,
was 39.6 percent. I.R.C. § l(a) (2000) (current version at I.R.C. § 1(a) (Supp. III 2003)).
308 Pytka, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 461, at *5-7.
'09 Id. at *13-16, 18.
310 Id. at *1.
3" Id. at *2.
312 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 2, 11 (1994).
313 Pytka, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 461, at *25-28.
314 Id. at * 16-17. The plaintiffs expert calculated this additional amount to be $222,605,
based on the plaintiff's tax rate. Id. at *17.
315 Id. at *26 n.1.
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this was simply because it was not convinced the judgment would be
taxable, or for other reasons.316
Before leaving Pytka, several sidelight aspects of the case are most
fascinating and deserve brief mention. It turned out that Fineberg, the
"attorney" hired by Pytka was not actually admitted in any jurisdiction. 17
Nevertheless, since he and the firm held him out as a licensed attorney, he
was treated as such for liability purposes. The court specifically held that
this was appropriate, even though the various tort (i.e., negligence, deceit,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty) and contract claims
were based on legal misrepresentation theories. 318  Furthermore, since
Fineberg was held out as having special competence in a wide variety of
corporate law specialties, he was held to the higher standard applicable to
such specialists.
319
Clark v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P.,32° which is discussed in more
detail later 32' also involved the unavailability of long-term capital gains
treatment promised to the plaintiffs by their accountant. In Clark, the
plaintiffs were advised to sell their insurance agency back to the insurance
company for a lump sum payment before the end of 1986 in order to obtain
favorable long-term capital gains treatment. When long-term treatment
was ultimately determined to be unavailable, this suit against the
accountant ensued. Unfortunately, the opinion only addressed the statute
of limitations and not the substance of the cause of action.322 The opinion
did not disclose whether long-term capital gains treatment may have been
achievable by some other disposition.
c. Litigation Settlement Advice
In Naqvi v. Rossiello,323 the defendant attorney had represented the
plaintiff in a retaliatory discharge action against plaintiff's employer in
1988. That action sought recovery for lost compensation, as well as
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress. The plaintiff sought both
compensatory and punitive damages in equal amounts, but failed to seek
separate amounts for each injury.324 In January 1992, the defendant
316 Id.
317 Id. at *7-8.
311 Id. at*17-18.
319 Id. at *19.
320 34 P.3d 209 (Utah 2001).
321 See infra Part ILE. 1.
322 See Clark, 34 P.3d at 210-11, 218. The court reversed the dismissal of the action by the
court below. Id. at 218.
323 746 N.E.2d 873 (111. App. Ct. 2001).
324 Id. at 874-75.
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conveyed a settlement offer from the former employer, and advised the
plaintiff that the settlement proceeds would be nontaxable. The litigation
was then settled.325
The settlement neglected to allocate the settlement amount among the
specific injuries alleged, or even between compensatory and punitive
portions.12  In 1995, the IRS audited the plaintiffs 1992 tax return and
ultimately found that the entire settlement proceeds were taxable. In light
of the fact that the settlement agreement contained no apportionment, the
IRS simply followed the complaint and treated the settlement as half for
punitive damages and half for compensatory damages, ultimately
concluding each half was taxable.327
The plaintiff then commenced this malpractice action against his
attorney alleging that he would not have agreed to the settlement if he had
known it was taxable. Further, plaintiff alleged that failing to include an
apportionment of the settlement proceeds to the specific injuries
constituted negligence.328
The trial court agreed with the defendant-attorney and granted
summary judgment, reasoning that the advice that the settlement was non-
taxable was correct when given, 329 and that the IRS utilized later case law
to retroactively treat the plaintiffs recovery as taxable.33 ° On appeal, the
Illinois appellate court reversed, holding that even when the advice was
rendered, the relevant tax law331 was clear enough for the attorney to have
realized that recoveries for different types of injuries were taxed
differently: amounts received for embarrassment, humiliation and mental
distress were likely nontaxable, while back wages and punitive damages
were taxable. 332 Accordingly, the court held enough factual questions
existed to warrant a trial.333
Jalali v. Roo? 34 also involved incorrect tax advice given in
connection with the settlement of a litigation. In Jalali, the defendant




329 Id. at 875-76.
330 Id. at 876-77.
331 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
332 Naqui, 746 N.E.2d at 880.
333 Id. It is interesting to note that the court's analysis of the different treatment accorded to
different types of recoveries would have seemed to presage a holding that there were material
issues as to whether the defendant's failure to include any apportionment in the settlement
agreement was negligent. Instead, the court concluded that the negligence issue that required a
trial was the defendant's advice that the settlement proceeds were nontaxable. Id.
114 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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attorney had represented the plaintiff in a suit against her former employer
for racial discrimination and sexual harassment. After the first phase of a
bifurcated trial, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $750,000 and
found the necessary preconditions to justify punitive damages in the
second phase. The case was then settled for $2.75 million.335 In deciding
to accept the settlement offer, the plaintiff was advised by the defendant
that she would have to pay taxes only on her share of the settlement, after
deducting her attorney's fees. In fact, the plaintiff consequently paid taxes
on the entire $2.75 million, without any deduction for her attorney's
fees.336 At the malpractice trial, the plaintiff was awarded this difference
of $310,000 as damages. 337
This verdict was reversed on appeal.338 The ostensible reason for the
reversal was that the plaintiff, according to the court, did not establish any
damages because she never proved that a higher recovery was possible in
the underlying discrimination action.
339
To this author, however, it appears that the real basis for the
California Court of Appeals' decision was the determination that it would
be unfair and unjust to impose any damages against the defendant attorney.
The basis for this seems to be twofold. First, the court seemed convinced
that the attorney obtained a very successful, if not optimal, recovery in the
litigation against the plaintiffs employer. 340 As such, the court seems to
have discounted the possibility that, even with correct tax advice, the
plaintiff would have refused to settle the case for $2.75 million in hopes of
obtaining a larger amount after trial. According to the court, the only
possible reason for not settling for $2.75 million was the psychic
satisfaction of publicly exposing her employer at trial-a non-monetary
lOSS. 34 1 The second factor that seemed to have motivated the court was that
the advice was intuitive; it represented the law in at least three other
342circuits and was supported by legal commentary. In addition, the correct
law was "counterintuitive,, 343 and a seemingly unintended by-product of
the enactment of the alternative minimum tax.3
44
331 Id. at 690.
336 Id. at 692.
337 id.
338 Id. at 700.
339 Id. at 696.
340 Id. at 690-92.
341 Id. at 693; cf id. at 696-97 (expanding on the psychic issue).
342 Id. at 693-94.





Divorce is often a very tense, stress-filled, and emotionally charged
time, and the parties involved are typically extremely bitter and
acrimonious towards one another. This recipe almost guarantees many
malpractice suits, particularly since even slight factual deviations could
sometimes alter the expected tax consequences. 345  Recently, several
additional cases have arisen.
In Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P. C. ,346 a divorced wife
sued her divorce lawyer for allegedly failing to inform her that two issues
relevant to her divorce were unsettled under relevant Nebraska law, and
that both were resolved against her in the divorce settlement. The first
issue, a non-tax issue, involved unvested stock options owned by her
husband, and whether they were treated as marital property for purposes of
the property settlement. The second, a tax-related issue, concerned
whether, for purposes of the property settlement, stock owned by the
marital estate should be reduced in value to reflect the more than $2 10,000
in potential capital gains tax that inhered in the stock.347 The trial court
directed a verdict in favor of the attorney,348 and the Nebraska Court of
Appeals affirmed on the basis of the judgmental immunity rule.349 Under
this rule, when a point of law is unsettled and reasonable doubt may be
entertained by well-informed lawyers, an attorney may not be held liable
for an error in judgment 350 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
reversed, holding that attorneys have a duty to inform clients that the issue
is uncertain, thereby allowing clients to make an informed choice among
the reasonable alternatives.35 1 The court followed Williams v. Ely,352
which adopted this rule in Massachusetts several years earlier.
353
In re Marriage of Bielawski354 involved an issue similar to Wood In
Bielawski, the divorced wife claimed she was not properly advised about
how to treat her husband's pension when considering her marital
settlement agreement.355 While the plaintiff sought to vacate the marital
settlement agreement-which is not directly relevant to this article's
345 See Todres, supra note 1, at 591.
346 589 N.W.2d 103 (Neb. 1999).
311 Id. at 104.
348 Id. at 105.
349 Id.
350 Id. at 105-06.
351 Id. at 106.
352 668 N.E.2d 799 (Mass. 1996).
313 Wood, 589 N.W.2d at 106-07.
354 764 N.E.2d 1254 (111. App. Ct. 2002).
... Id. at 1256-58.
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focus-it does refer to a malpractice case filed by the wife against her
attorney for failure to properly advise her of the tax consequences of
treating the pension as income.356
Taylor v. Goddard357 is relevant, though it arises not in a divorce
context but from a settlement agreement entered into by two unmarried
persons who had been living together in a "meretricious relationship" in
Washington State. 358 In addition to raising certain substantive issues, the
plaintiff alleged a failure to properly advise about the tax consequences of
the settlement agreement.359 As part of the settlement agreement, one of
the plaintiffs corporations would make a $600,000 distribution to the
woman and indemnify her for any taxes incurred. The problem, according
to the plaintiff, was that he was never advised of the so called "tax-on-tax"
consequences.360  Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the evidence disclosed
that the defendant tax attorney actually advised the plaintiff that there was
no way to make the $600,000 tax free to the recipient, and that despite his
attorney's concerns, the plaintiff "believed that the settlement would be tax
free to him and decided to sign the agreement and 'worry about [the
recipient's] taxes later[.]' 36' The court therefore affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant.362
e. Miscellaneous
(1) Tax Shelters/Investments
Sommerville v. Hochman, Salkin & DeRoy363 involved a legal
malpractice suit arising out of investments in a commodities straddle tax
356 Id. at 1263.
3" No. 49164-4-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 2271 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2002).
358 Id. at * 1-2.
359 Id.
360 Id. at *3-5. The "tax-on-tax" consequences can be traced back to Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). In Old Colony, the Supreme Court held that if an
employer pays the income taxes of an employee pursuant to a contract in which the employer
agreed to give the employee certain wages net or free of tax, the income taxes paid by the
employer themselves become taxable gross income to the employee. Id. at 729-30. To illustrate,
assume a tax rate of 50% and that in year one employee is given $1 million of salary "tax free."
On April 15 of year two when the employer pays the employee's $500,000 of income taxes for
year one, the $500,000 is gross income to the employee. This in turn requires a payment of
$250,000 in taxes on April 15 of year three (i.e., fifty percent of year two gross income of
$500,000) and so forth. This would continue on for a number of years until the amounts involved
approach zero.
161 Taylor, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 2271, at *3-4 (alterations in original) (quoting the
plaintiffs testimony in the case).
362 Id. at *16-18.
363 No. G030625, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1624 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2004).
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shelter, a type of tax shelter popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 364
The facts date back to 1980 through 1982 and the court was asked to
determine whether the suit was time barred.36 5 The plaintiffs were
investors who had purchased various positions in commodities based on
opinions issued by the defendant law firm and its partner, Salkin, that the
366losses generated by the program were deductible for tax purposes.
Two types of malpractice were alleged against the defendants. The
first type concerned the undisclosed relationship between the attorneys and
the brokerage firm that sold the plaintiffs their investment package. The
defendant law firm's opinion, which found the promised tax benefits
would be available, was presented as if rendered by independent counsel
who undertook a disinterested review of the plan.367 In fact, counsel was
neither independent nor disinterested. G. Hunter & Associates, the
brokerage firm that sold the plaintiffs the commodities straddle product,
was organized by defendant Salkin. Hunter's salespeople were trained in
the tax rules of commodities trading by the defendant law firm.
Furthermore, the law firm had agreed to: (1) render opinion letters for
distribution to potential customers; (2) be involved with any IRS audits of
customers concerning the program; (3) prepare a protest for any customer
who received a thirty-day letter from the IRS; and (4) bring a test case to
establish the validity of the program. The law firm received a commission
for every commodities contract traded by Hunter.368 Also, Salkin and
another partner in the defendant law firm created another limited
partnership that invested in the same commodities straddle program.369
364 In the commodities straddle tax shelter a taxpayer would buy one or several contracts for
the future delivery of a commodity (the long position). The taxpayer would simultaneously sell
an equivalent number of contracts obligating him to delver the same commodity in the future (the
short position), but this contract would be due in a different month than the long contract. As the
price of the commodity fluctuated either up or down, one of the contracts would typically make
money while the other lost money in roughly the same amount. The loss position would then be
closed out (perhaps with some machinations involving cancellation rather than purchase or sale)
generating the loss sought by the shelter investor. To avoid any economic loss from investing in
commodities, the closed position would be replaced by a similar position (either long or short) in
the same commodity but with a due date in a different month. If this worked as advertised,
substantial losses could be generated for tax purposes without any significant risk. See generally
Samuel C. Thompson, An Examination of the Effect of Recent Legislation on Commodity Tax
Schedules, 2 VA. TAX REV. 165, 165-71 (1983).
365 Sommerville, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1624, at *21-22 (reversing the trial court's
award of summary judgment to the defendants on statute of limitations grounds).
366 Id. at * 1-2.
367 Id. at *12, 5.
368 Id. at *3-4.
369 Id. at *5.
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The second type of malpractice alleged concerned reassurances that
the Hunter program was valid. At the same time the defendants were
reassuring the plaintiffs that the program was valid, they were
simultaneously warning another favored group of investors that the IRS
would likely audit all Hunter investors and gave the other group the
opportunity to rescind their investment in Hunter programs.
370
It is an interesting commentary on our legal system that the litigants
in Sommerville will have yet another day in court on statute of limitations
issues on facts that occurred approximately twenty-four years ago.
If Sommerville is a straggler from an earlier generation of tax shelters,
Loftin v. KPMG, L.L.P.3 71 is a harbinger of the type of cases that can be
expected in coming years in light of the IRS's recent crackdown on the
current generation of tax shelters.
In Loftin, the plaintiff sold stock in 1997 and 1999 and netted capital
gains of $30 million and $65 million, respectively. Upon depositing the
proceeds from the 1997 sale, the plaintiffs banker encouraged plaintiff to
retain defendant KPMG for planning purposes in regard to the $30 million
capital gain. Plaintiff met with KPMG and was presented with a "FLIP"
tax planning strategy.372 If effective, the FLIP strategy would generate
large capital losses, offsetting the capital gains, thereby saving the plaintiff
tax on the capital gain. KPMG assured the plaintiff that the FLIP strategy
370 Id. at *12-13, 13 n.2.
311 No. 02-81166-CIV, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2003). Jacoboni
v. KPMG L.L.P., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (M.D. Fla. 2004), involved the same type of tax shelter as
Loftin sold by the same defendant, the big four accounting firm of KPMG, L.L.P., also utilizing a
tax opinion of Brown & Wood. However, only Loftin is focused on in the text because it
describes the underlying tax machinations with some more detail and somewhat addresses the
malpractice claim (even if it is just to hold it premature). See id. at 1179-81. Jacoboni, on the
other hand, focused only on whether the plaintiff's RICO claim was precluded by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), (holding it
was) and then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the common law fraud and
malpractice-type claims, holding they should be litigated in state court. Id. at 1173-74.
372 A "FLIP" strategy is a type of basis-shifting transaction described in I.R.S. Notice 2001-
45, 2001-2 C.B. 129. In this type of transaction, an ownership relationship within I.R.C. § 318 is
created between a U.S. taxpayer seeking a tax shelter and an entity that is indifferent to U.S. tax
consequences, typically a foreign entity. The tax-indifferent entity then purchases stock and
subsequently has it redeemed. Under U.S. tax rules, which, in any event, do not apply to the tax-
indifferent foreign entity, the redemption is crafted to be treated as a dividend rather than a sale
under I.R.C. §§ 302 and 318. Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the U.S. tax rules to the
redemption, the U.S. person seeking the shelter argues that under the U.S. tax rules, he
nevertheless obtains the tax basis of the tax-indifferent party as though the U.S. tax rules had
applied to the redemption. As a result, when the U.S. shelter-seeker sells securities at a price
roughly equal to their cost, a large tax loss is reported due to the additional basis purportedly
shifted to the securities under § 302 regulations from the related foreign, tax-indifferent party.
It should be noted that Loftin also refers to a "BLIP" shelter strategy in the opinion, but
never describes the "BLIP" strategy. Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *8-9.
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was consistent with IRS rules and regulations and "would withstand an
IRS audit." '373 KPMG subsequently delivered its own opinion and the
opinion of the law firm Brown & Wood that "the FLIP strategy was 'more
likely than not' to be considered proper., 374 The plaintiff decided to utilize
the FLIP strategy. He then retained KPMG and another firm that KPMG
required him to retain in order to implement the strategy. KPMG was also
retained to prepare his 1997 tax return.375 A similar scenario occurred in
1999 with respect to the plaintiffs 1999 capital gain.
376
In reality, the FLIP strategy is ineffective. The IRS initiated an audit
of the plaintiffs 1997 tax return in October 2000377 and subsequently
issued an announcement challenging the efficacy of such types of
transactions. 378  Following these developments, KPMG encouraged the
plaintiff to settle with the IRS.379
This suit was commenced by the plaintiff against KPMG, Brown &
Wood, and the other participants in the FLIP strategy. The complaint
included allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, malpractice against KPMG and Brown & Wood, and a
RICO claim.380 The majority of the court's opinion in Loftin addressed the
issue of whether the RICO claim was barred by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.381 Ultimately, the court held it was
barred.382 The other allegations were held by the court to be premature
because Loftin had not yet settled with the IRS, and therefore did not incur
damages, an essential element for all of the other causes of action.383 The
court rather pointedly noted that if Loftin's settlement payment is solely
for back taxes and interest, there were no damages.384 This seems a bit
extreme to this author since Loftin presumably incurred professional fees
(attorneys and/or accountants) during the settlement negotiations as well as
transaction costs in effectuating the FLIP strategy, each of which should
comprise recoverable damages, if the plaintiffs allegations are proven.
373 Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *5.
174 Id. at *7.
371 Id. at *4-5.
376 Id. at *7-8.
177 Id. at *8
378 I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129.
179 Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *8
380 Id. at *8-9.
381 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
382 Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *10-21.
313 Id. at *22-25 (fraud and negligent misrepresentation); id. at *25-27 (breach of fiduciary
duty); id at *27-29 (malpractice).
3" Id. at *24.
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Wiste v. Neff & Co.385 involved an allegation that an accountant
advised a married couple to invest in a tax shelter which later turned out to
be defective. In Wiste, the investments were made in 1982 and 1983. The
final IRS determination that additional taxes amounting to almost $35,000
were owed was received in 1996. By then, the interest and penalties
accumulated to over $172,000.3 8 6 The decision focused on when the New
Mexico statute of limitations accrued.387
Similarly, in Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P. v.
Munao,388 the defendants, as a counterclaim in a law firm's suit to recover
legal fees, asserted that the attorneys negligently advised the defendants
"they could shelter income through a certain joint venture. 389  In
Proskauer Rose, the First Department of the New York Appellate Division
affirmed the denial below of the law firm's motion to dismiss the
counterclaim.390 In its brief decision, the First Department indicated that in
determining the amount of damages, it would be relevant to consider the
additional taxes and related expenses incurred by the defendants on
account of the law firm's advice as well as any offsetting profits they may
have realized from the advice.391
Finally, brief note should be taken of Hnath v. Vecchitto.3 92 In Hnath,
while having their tax returns prepared, the taxpayers received investment
advice from their accountant on two occasions. They followed the advice
and purchased the recommended limited partnership interests. Within
several years, problems developed with the investments and the taxpayers
filed a suit against the accountant.393 While the case really involved the
issue of whether investment advice was proper, it was framed as an
accountant malpractice action.3 94 The issue before the court was whether
the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds. The court denied the defendant summary judgment because the
court felt that Connecticut's continuous representation doctrine, used to
toll the statute of limitations in attorney malpractice cases, could be
385 967 P.2d 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
386 Id. at 1173.
311 Id. at 1176 (holding that the statute of limitations had expired, and affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant).
388 270 A.D.2d 150, 704 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep't 2000).
389 Id. at 150-51, 704 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
390 Id. at 150, 704 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
391 Id. at 151, 704 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
... No. X03CV930502901, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1063, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
20, 2003).
'9' Id. at *1, 16-17.
" Id. at *3-4.
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relevant in light of the similarity between attorney-client and accountant-
client relationships.395 The court, however, declined to address the issue.396
(2) Bankruptcy-Related
In Guillot v. Smith397 a taxpayer, who had incurred substantial federal
income tax liabilities, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. Two
years later, the taxpayer encountered additional financial problems and
could no longer make the planned payments. She was advised by the
defendant that if she converted her Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan into a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy plan, her tax liability would be discharged, except
for $2300. This advice turned out to be incorrect and the taxpayer
ultimately sued the attorney for malpractice.398 The decision did not focus
on the substance of the claim, but only on whether the Texas statute of
limitations was tolled due to the continued representation of the taxpayer
by the defendant attorney.399
(3) Pension-Related
In Leather v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y .,400 the plaintiff sued a
financial planning company for losses sustained when it failed to advise
him "that his pension plan had become fully funded and needed to be
rolled over into an IRA in order to avoid excise taxes. 4 °1 The appellate
court affirmed the grant of defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action for professional malpractice and breach of fiduciary
duty and further affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the
claim for breach of contract.4 °2 In the course of explaining its affirmance,
the court pointedly noted that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant
financial planning company was engaged in a "profession. 'AO3
Lewis v. Bank of America N.A.4 °4 also involved a suit against a
financial institution, here a bank and its loan officer, for taxes incurred as a
result of bad pension-related advice. In Lewis, the plaintiff sought to
... Id. at *22. The continuous representation the plaintiffs alleged was that the defendant
accountant continued to prepare the plaintiffs' tax returns for several years after the investment
advice was given and until 1992, the year in which this suit was instituted. Id. at *16-17.
396 Id. at *22.
197 998 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
398 Id. at 631.
9 Id. at 632-33. The court held the statute of limitations was tolled and reversed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 633.
00 279 A.D.2d 311, 720 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1st Dep't 2001).
401 Id. at311, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
402 Id.
13 Id. at 312, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 449-50.
404 343 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2003).
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borrow funds from the defendant bank for use in his son's business. The
bank informed plaintiff that it would lend the money only of the plaintiff
withdrew the balances from his two pension plans, placed the funds into
CDs at the bank, and used these CDs as collateral for the loan. 40 5 It turned
out that the money withdrawn by the plaintiff from his pension plans was
taxable.4 6 After a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded substantial damages
on his claim that the bank was guilty of breach of contract and fraudulent
inducement in causing the plaintiff to incur taxes on the withdrawal of his
pension funds.4°7 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment in
favor of the plaintiff because the jury in its verdict had found that the bank
had agreed to place the funds from the plaintiffs pension plans into "tax-
deferred IRA CDs. ' ,40 8 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, under the relevant
tax law,40 9 even if the pension funds had been placed in an IRA account,
pledging the IRA as security for a loan had precisely the same tax effect as
withdrawing the funds from the pension plan and investing them in non-
IRA CDs-i.e., the funds become taxable. Accordingly, the breach by the
bank did not cause the plaintiff any damages.410
2. Estate and Gift Tax Planning
There seems to be a relatively large number of reported malpractice
cases in the estate and gift tax planning area. Those involving late-filed
returns and allegations of mistakes in the return filing process have been
discussed previously 411 and that discussion will not be repeated.
As a general observation, many of the recent cases in this area arise
when an heir asserts some failing by either the draftsman of a trust or will
or by the counsel or accountant for the estate. Because the heir was never
a client of the defendant, many of the cases involve assertions of lack of
privity, sometimes presented as lack of standing, as a defense. This and
the statute of limitations are the most frequently encountered defenses in
this area.
405 Id. at 543.
406 Id. at 543; see I.R.C. § 402 (2000).
407 Lewis, 343 F.3d at 542, 544-45.
408 Id. at 545.
409 Id.; see I.R.C. § 408(e)(4).
410 Lewis, 343 F.3d at 545. A majority of the Fifth Circuit panel also held there was
inadequate evidence to find the bank guilty of fraud because it had represented that the
borrowing by the plaintiff could be accomplished tax-free. Id. at 545-47.




In Patterson v. Checkett4 12 the defendant attorney had developed an
estate plan for the decedent and his wife. The plan required the creation of
a non-marital trust by each spouse. Each trust was to be funded with
$600,000, the maximum amount that could then be transferred without
incurring any estate tax. When the decedent husband died, his trust was
underfunded by around $185,000. 4 " The primary414 malpractice allegedly
committed by the attorney was failing to insure that each trust was fully
funded.41 5 After trial, the judge granted the defendant attorney judgment
notwithstanding the verdict,416 which was affirmed on appeal.
41 7
While such a failing by an attorney might, in appropriate
circumstances, state a good cause of action, it did not in Patterson. As an
initial matter, due to procedural errors, two of the three points raised by the
plaintiffs on appeal were not even considered by the appellate court.4 8 As
to the third point raised, the court held there was a failure at trial to prove
damages.4 19
Factually, the attorney in Patterson did not seem to have been
negligent. The facts, as summarized by the Missouri Court of Appeals,
indicate that the attorney on several occasions informed his clients of the
need to fully fund the trust. He also advised them not to fund the trusts
with tax deferred assets such as individual retirement accounts or annuities
since the transfer of such assets would trigger income tax. Furthermore,
the clients had actually advised the attorney that they had finished funding
the trusts.
420
In addition, the case was premature. The primary damages asserted
were the extra estate taxes to be incurred on the $185,000 shortfall in the
decedent's trust.421 However, this amount, according to the court, would
only be incurred at the death of the surviving spouse, which had not yet
occurred. In addition, the court could not determine the actual tax
412 43 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
411 Id. at 479-80.
414 There was also an allegation that during the post-mortem planning, the defendant
advised that an inappropriate asset-a tax deferred annuity-be placed in the trust, causing the
estate to incur unnecessary tax. Id. at 480.
415 Id.
416 Id. at 480.
411 Id. at 482.
418 The court held that the Appellants (plaintiffs) did not specify any legal reason for the
reversal they sought and they waived these arguments by failing to set them forth in the
alternative motion for a new trial. Id. at 480-82.
411 Id. at 482.
421 Id. at 479.
421 Id. at 480.
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consequences because a "charitable aspect of the trusts" would have
reduced any tax liability in any event.2
A successful allegation of deficient estate planning advice by an
attorney is illustrated by Estate of Nevelson v. Carro, Spanbock, Kaster &
Cuiffo.423  Here, the defendant law firm had rendered estate planning
advice to Louise Nevelson, a prominent sculptor, and her son. The law
firm had advised the parties to set up a corporation, owned by the son,
which would employ Louise Nevelson and sell her artwork. By this
device, it was intended that any artwork owned by the corporation at Ms.
Nevelson's death, would remain out of her estate.424 After Ms. Nevelson's
death, the IRS treated the corporation as a sham because Ms. Nevelson had
never been adequately compensated by the corporation. As a result, all of
the corporation's assets were treated as belonging to Ms. Nevelson's estate
and all salary payments made over eleven years by the corporation to Ms.
Nevelson's son were treated as gifts by Ms' Nevelson.
The complaint in Estate of Nevelson charged that the defendant law
firm never advised the plaintiffs of the need to adequately compensate Ms.
Nevelson, nor did it warn of the risks attendant upon insufficient
compensation. 25  The New York Appellate Division held that these
allegations properly stated a cause of action and reversed the summary
judgment granted to the defendant law firm by the court below.426
Two recent cases suggest that failure to utilize common estate tax
saving devices may give rise to recoverable damages in a malpractice suit,
though both cases focused on procedural issues. In Sorkowitz v. Lakritz,
427Wissbrun & Associates, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
attorneys provided estate planning services to the decedents and violated
their duties and the required standard of care by failing to include a
Crummey power 428 in the estate planning documents. 429 The trial court
422 Id.
423 259 A.D.2d 282, 686 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1st Dep't 1999).
424 Id. at 282, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
425 Id. at 283, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
426 Id. at 282, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
427 683 N.W.2d 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
421 Under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2000), an annual exclusion from estate and gift taxes is
available for certain gifts of a present interest in property. When property is gifted to a trust for
future use by or for a beneficiary, the annual exclusion ordinarily would not be available since
this would not constitute a present interest in the gifted property. However, if the trust contains a
provision that grants the beneficiary a right to immediately withdraw an amount from the trust,
this is treated as a present interest in the trust and the annual exclusion is available. This
withdrawal right is known as a "Crummey" power or right, named after the Ninth Circuit case
that approved its use. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); see also
Sorkowitz, 683 N.W.2d at 212 (explaining Crummey powers).
429 Sorkowitz, 683 N.W.2d at 211. The complaint also alleged a failure to include necessary
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dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, accepting defendants'
position that under Michigan law "only those who can establish, without
the use of extrinsic evidence, that a decedent's intent has been frustrated by
an attorney's negligent drafting of estate planning documents have
standing to pursue a legal malpractice action against that attorney." 43 ° The
trial court held that, since the plaintiffs here needed to resort to extrinsic
evidence-i.e., to an expert's affidavit that the use of Crummey powers has
become standard practice in estate planning and that failure to include a
Crummey power is unusual and extraordinary-the suit could not
proceed.43' On appeal, the court reversed, focusing solely on this issue. It
held that the rule applied by the trial court was inapposite and dismissal of
the complaint was incorrect.432
In Coin v. Bush,433 the plaintiff, who was the son of the decedent,
sued the decedent's attorney and others for failing to create a family
limited partnership,434 which resulted in an additional $1 million in estate
taxes.435 The complaint also contained an allegation that the attorney and
others conspired to delay the creation of a family limited partnership.436
Under relevant California law, in order to assert a cause of action against
an attorney for civil conspiracy with his or her client, it was necessary in
generation-skipping tax language in the estate planning documents, but the case focused only on
the Crummy power omission.
430 Id. at 212. See generally MICH. CT. R. 2.116(C)(8) (detailing Michigan's requirements
for a court to grant a summary disposition on stipulated facts).
431 Sorkowitz, 683 N.W.2d at 212-13.
432 Id. at 216.
4" No. B164613, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4257 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2004).
434 When property is valued for federal estate and gift tax purposes a valuation discount is
available when a non-controlling interest in property is involved. The discount reflects the facts
that such co-owned property lacks marketability and is a non-controlling interest. To illustrate,
assume a business owned by an elderly parent is worth $1 million and that parent gives one-third
of the business to each of his or her two children. In valuing the gifts for gift tax purposes, the
value of each gift will be less than $333,333, since a partial interest in property is less marketable
than a 100% interest. Also, a further discount is available since the interest is less than a
controlling, majority interest. Similarly, when the parent dies, for estate tax purposes the retained
one third-interest in the business will, for the same reasons, be valued at less than $333,333. In
effect, by creating such partial interests in property, the sum of the value of the parts is less, and
often substantially less, than the value of the whole, despite the fact that the various interests are
owned by related persons, or entities, who may be expected to act together to optimize their
respective holdings.
This transfer-tax magic is frequently accomplished by transferring property to a partnership
(often a limited partnership) and giving varying interests in the partnership to various family
members. Hence, the "family limited partnership." See generally Laura E. Cunningham,
Remember The Alamo: The IRS Needs Ammunition in its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAx NOTES
1461 (2000).
... Coin, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4257, at *1-2.
436 ld.
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certain instances to first obtain a pre-filing order from the trial court.437 No
such order was obtained in this case. The trial court granted the
defendants' motion to strike only the conspiracy claim, but not the other
claims contained in the complaint. Upon defendants' appeal, the
California Court of Appeals addressed only this procedural issue, limiting
its affirmation to the trial court's dismissal of the conspiracy claim.
Two other cases involve allegations of bad estate planning advice,
though neither case details the facts adequately to understand the precise
problem complained of. In Peterson v. Wallach439 the plaintiff was the
daughter of a decedent who had retained the defendant attorney to
minimize her estate taxes, and, correspondingly, to increase the assets to be
received by the plaintiff on her mother's death. Relying on this advice, the
mother made inter vivos gifts to the plaintiff in 1990 and 1991 totaling
approximately $580,000. The problem, according to the plaintiff, was that
these gifts were "added back" into her mother's estate when she died in
1996, allegedly resulting in increased estate taxes of $238,000.440
The perplexing aspect of this allegation is that it demonstrates a
serious misunderstanding of the basic structure of the estate tax
computation. While prior gifts are initially added back to the estate tax
computation,441 there is a subsequent deduction for the tax attributable to
such added-back gifts. 442 The net effect is simply to push the amount
subject to estate tax to a higher level on the graduated estate tax rate
schedule, but not to subject the gifts to multiple taxation." 3 Similarly, if
the plaintiffs complaint is simply about being pushed into the higher tax
rate bracket, the complaint is also misdirected because retaining the money
until death without making a gift would result in incurring the same
amount of tax 444 and possibly more if the retained money generated any
interest income while held by the donor.
Unfortunately, Peterson focuses on a statute of limitations issue and
does not focus on the substantive allegation in any more detail.
437 Id. at 2 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10(a) (Deering 1994)).
438 Id. at 17-18.
439 733 N.E.2d 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
440 Id. at 714-15.
441 See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2004).
442 See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(i)-(2).
443 See RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1.02[4],
2.01. (8th ed. 2002).
44 Since the same rate schedule is utilized for both inter vivos and testamentary transfers,
and the tax is cumulative based on all prior transfers, the same cost will be incurred if property is
given away during the donor's lifetime or at death, subject though to timing differences. Cf id.
9.03[2].
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Similar to the allegation made in Peterson is the claim against the
defendant attorney in Boardman v. Stark.445 In Boardman, a deceased
husband had previously established a trust under which his wife was to
benefit for her life and with the remainder going to their children. When
the husband died in 1985, the defendant filed the federal estate tax return
on behalf of the estate. On the return, as would be expected, he made the
qualified terminable interest property ("QTIP") election, without which the
husband's estate would not have been entitled to a marital deduction for
the trust assets.446 In July 2000, this suit was filed alleging legal
malpractice because of the QTIP election.447 The claim made by the
plaintiffs, who were the widow and children of the deceased, was that upon
the death of the surviving widow "the QTIP election will have the effect of
transferring the property from the trust into... [the widow's] taxable
estate instead of allowing the property to pass to the ... children free of
any estate taxes."" 8 The problem with this allegation is that this is exactly
how the QTIP provision is intended to work. In exchange for a marital
deduction to the first spouse's estate, the property must be included in the
estate of the surviving spouse. 449 The property never could pass to the
children free of estate taxes-the property must be taxed at the death of
one spouse or the other.
In Boardman, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendant attorney on the grounds that
the case was premature. Since the widow was still alive, no damages had
yet been incurred.45 ° Interestingly, when the plaintiffs moved to stay the
proceedings in the lower court until the widow died and the damages
become known, the motion was denied.451
b. Drafting Errors
In Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P. C.,452 the decedent
wanted to leave to each of her two housekeepers a remembrance of $5000,
and ten percent of the sizeable residue of her estate to certain qualified
44' No. 20911, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3790 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2002).
446 See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).
447 Boardman, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3790, at *2.
448 Id.
449 See I.R.C. § 2044 (including in the value of the gross estate of a decedent any property
in which the decedent took an election based on a qualifying income interest for life). If the
surviving spouse transfers the QTIP interest while alive, the tax will be triggered then. See id. §
2519.
450 Boardman, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3790, at *6.
451 Id. at *2-3.
452 568 S.E.2d 693 (Va. 2002).
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charities. The defendant attorneys who drafted decedent's will and created
a revocable trust included language that merely suggested the amount to be
left to the housekeepers, but left the final amount to the trustee's
discretion.45 3 Because the bequest to the housekeepers was left to the
trustee's discretion, the value of the bequests to the charities was not
ascertainable at the decedent's death, and therefore not deductible for
federal estate tax purposes.454 As a result, upon the decedent's death her
estate incurred additional estate tax liabilities of almost $664,000. 45s
Although the attorneys clearly erred and substantial damages were
obviously present, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
this action brought by the executor of the decedent's estate against the
attorneys.456 Under Virginia law, a cause of action survives the death of
the person owning the cause of action if it "existed" prior to that person's
death.457 One of the necessary elements for a cause of action for legal
malpractice in Virginia is the existence of damages.45 8 According to the
Virginia Supreme Court in Rutter, there were no "damages" while the
decedent was alive. All the damages-the additional estate tax and
associated legal and accounting fees-arose after death. Since no cause of
action "existed" while the decedent was alive, nothing survived that could
be asserted by the estate's executor.45 9
The result in Rutter is quite remarkable! There was certainly a
drafting error that caused very substantial and foreseeable damages, yet no
remedy was available. In fact, redress would never seem to be available
for any similar faulty drafting of estate documents.
If the plaintiff in Rutter was out of luck, the plaintiff in Harmeyer v.
Gustafson460 could easily feel the deck was irreversibly stacked against
her. Here, the defendant attorney prepared irrevocable trusts, which were
immediately funded, for the plaintiff and her husband, Gordon, in 1990.
Then, in 1994, the defendant prepared a quitclaim deed that transferred the
Harmeyers' homestead to certain nieces and nephews while retaining a life
estate for the Harmeyers. 461 Gordon Harmeyer died in 1996. The plaintiff
then obtained legal advice from a different attorney and subsequently
learned that the documents drafted by the defendant were defective and
411 Id. at 694.
454 Id. at 694; see I.R.C. § 2055(a).
41' Rutter, 568 S.E.2d at 694.
456 Id. at 695.
457 Id. at 694-95 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (Michie 2000)).
4-8 Id. at 695.
459 id
460 No. C8-00-1191, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 175 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2001).
46' Id. at * 1-2.
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would increase the estate taxes incurred by the plaintiff upon her death.462
While the court did not dwell on the nature of the defendant's errors, it
appears that the trust documents gave the Harmeyers annual income from
the trusts, and the quitclaim deed retained for them a life estate in the
transferred homestead. Both of these provisions violate I.R.C. § 2036 and
would result in bringing back into the gross estate and subjecting to estate
tax some of the property transferred away.463 The plaintiff instituted this
action against the defendant in 1999.
464
In Harmeyer, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's award of summary judgment to the defendant on both causes of
action. With respect to the defective trusts, the Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiffs action was barred by the statute of limitations. In Minnesota
the statute of limitations for legal malpractice is six years,465 and there is
no discovery rule for legal malpractice actions that would toll the running
of the statute.466 The court held that the statute commenced in 1990, when
the trust documents were signed. At that time, according to the court,
damages were incurred because the trusts did not "transfer assets out of the
taxable estates of both... Harmeyer[s], thereby saving estate taxes. 4 67
The Harmeyers' ignorance of the problem was irrelevant.468
Similarly, with respect to the error on the quitclaim deed, even though
the action was timely, the court nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the
cause of action. The court believed that the damages were too
"[s]peculative, remote, or conjectural" to permit recovery. 469  Actual
damages could not be determined until the plaintiffs death. According to
the court, "[a]ttempting to calculate future tax consequences requires
speculation as to when Harmeyer will die, what the value of her estate will
be, and what the tax law will be at the time of her death." 4 70 This, said the
court, is too speculative to allow any recovery now.
The bottom line for the plaintiff here: if you wait too long the statute
of limitations will expire; if you do not wait, you are premature because
462 Id. at *2.
463 The value of the gross estate includes property that a decedent gratuitously transferred
during his lifetime if he retained for his lifetime either possession of the property or income from
the property. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2000).
464 Harmeyer, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 175, at *7.
465 Id. at *1, 4 (citing MiNN. STAT. § 541.05(1)(5) (2000)).
466 Id. at *6 (citing Hermann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn.
1999)); see discussion infra Part II.E.5.
467 Harmeyer, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 175, at *5.
461 Id. at *6.
469 Id. at *7.
470 Id. at *7-9.
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you cannot yet prove any recoverable damages with the required
specificity. Result: No redress either way!
In contrast to Rutter and Harmeyer, the case of Porter v. Ogden,
Newell & Welch 471 involved a plaintiff who was well able to take care of
himself and, as a result, will get his day in court. In Porter, a will and trust
were prepared by two law firms, the defendants in this action. Under the
plan, the settlor of the trust had to include the trust corpus in his estate at
death. The trust, denominated as a "double generation skipping trust," was
to protect the trust's corpus from further transfer taxation until the death of
the grantor's great grandchildren. a Under the trust, the settlor's son,
Reverend Porter, became a co-trustee. For the trust's purpose to be
effectuated, it was essential that Reverend Porter not have a general power
of appointment over the trust. If he did have such a power, the trust corpus
would be included, and taxed, in his taxable estate.473
In 1990, Reverend Porter discovered a potential problem in the trust.
One of the paragraphs of the trust provided that the trustee had discretion
to distribute trust corpus to a beneficiary for the "welfare" of such
beneficiary.474 As both co-trustee and beneficiary, Reverend Porter had the
power to distribute trust corpus to himself for his "welfare." Under
relevant federal law, if "welfare" was a limited, ascertainable standard,
such a power would not be tantamount to a general power of
appointment.475 However, if "welfare" had no such limits but was wholly
discretionary, this power was tantamount to a general power of
appointment.476 The relevant Treasury regulation indicated that a power to
distribute corpus for someone's "welfare" was not limited and is treated as
a general power of appointment.477
Reverend Porter was advised by his law firm that federal law would
look to state law to determine whether "welfare" had an ascertainable
standard. However, the relevant Florida law was unsettled as to the
meaning of the word "welfare. 478
In order to solve his problem, Reverend Porter successfully lobbied
the Florida legislature to change the law to give the word "welfare" a
limited, ascertainable meaning. He then obtained a private letter ruling
47' 241 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2001).
472 Id. at 1336. It should be noted that current law prevents utilization of such a trust. See
I.R.C. §§ 2601-2664 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
473 Porter, 241 F.3d at 1337; see I.R.C. § 2041.
474 Porter, 241 F.3d at 1336-37.
471 Id. at 1336-37; see Treas. Reg. 20.2041-1(c)(2) (2004).
476 Porter, 241 F.3d at 1336-37; see Treas. Reg. 20.2041-1(c)(2) (2004).
47 See Porter, 241 F.3d at 1337.
478 Id.
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from the IRS that the corpus of the trust would not be included in his estate
under the revised Florida law. 479 To further protect his interests if Florida
ever changed the law again, Reverend Porter obtained a judicial
reformation of the trust instrument to eliminate the word "welfare" as a
scrivener's error. He then obtained a second private letter ruling from the
IRS that the judicial reformation would not cause any adverse tax
consequences.480
After Reverend Porter's death in 1999, the trustees of his estate
brought this malpractice action against the attorneys to recover the costs
expended in curing this general power of appointment problem.481
The Eleventh Circuit held that under Florida law the costs incurred by
Reverend Porter to cure the potential problem were actual damages
incurred and that the case was not premature as the district court below
held. Accordingly, Reverend Porter, or at least his estate, was entitled to
its day in court.
From a jurisprudential vantage, the issue of whether certain costs
incurred by Reverend Porter, such as the costs of lobbying the Florida
Legislature, are recoverable or are too remote and unforeseeable is most
482intriguing.
In Blair v. Ing,483 the Hawaii Supreme Court focused extensively on
the privity rules and determined whether beneficiaries may bring suit
against an attorney who drafted a trust instrument and against an
accountant who prepared the estate tax return. The underlying negligence
suit involved an allegation that the trust documents were erroneously
drafted.
In Blair, the parents of the plaintiffs retained Ing, the defendant
attorney, in 1988, to create an estate plan for the disposition of their assets.
As part of the plan, a revocable living trust was created with the parents as
trustees. In 1996, the plaintiffs' father died. Their mother, as executrix of
her husband's estate, hired Thayer, the defendant accountant, to prepare
the necessary estate tax returns. The plaintiffs' mother died in 1997. The
plaintiffs, who were the beneficiaries of the trust, then became successor
co-trustees. As co-trustees, they hired different attorneys and accountants
to review the trust documents and, presumably, to file the necessary tax




482 See id. at 1339-40.
483 21 P.3d 452 (Haw. 2001).
484 id. at 45 5-56.
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trust made a costly error. Although the documents disclosed the intent to
create a bypass trust, the documents failed to include a funding formula to
provide for its funding. This ended up costing additional taxes upon the
death of plaintiffs' mother in 1997.485 The plaintiffs also learned that the
accountant hired by their mother to prepare the estate tax returns for their
father's estate failed to utilize several tax savings techniques such as
disclaimers and the unified tax credit, again causing increased estate taxes
and diminishing the plaintiffs' inheritance.486 They then brought this
action against both the attorney and the accountant.
After an extensive analysis of the privity rules, the Hawaii Supreme
Court decided that the plaintiffs had standing to bring this action against
the attorney. However, the court decided they did not have standing to
bring this action against the accountant who had been hired only to prepare
the tax returns, not to render any estate planning advice.48 7
Anderson v. Glenn488 involved allegations of a defectively drafted
trust. However, the court directed most of its attention to the statute of
limitations issue before it and reviewed the substance of the underlying
allegation in a most abbreviated manner. In fact, for purposes of the
present appeal from the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendants, the parties simply assumed the trust was defectively
designed.48 9
In Anderson, the defendant attorneys prepared an irrevocable trust for
Ora and Albert Anderson in 1978. The purpose of the trust was to transfer
the Andersons' assets to their heirs while minimizing estate taxes. The
trust was funded in 1980 and Albert died in 1983. 49 0 The trust mandated
the payment of all net income earned by the trust to Albert and Ora
throughout their lifetimes. Presumably, this was the defective feature of
the trust because, under the Internal Revenue Code, property given away is
brought back into the gross estate where the donor retained the right to the
485 Id. at 456. The operation of the bypass trust is described later in this article. See infra
text accompanying notes 493-99 (discussing Karam v. Kliber, 655 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002)). It should be noted that Karam refers to the bypass trust as the family trust.
4 Blair, 21 P.3d at 456. Though the opinion never specifies, it would appear that the
gravamen of the complaint against the accountant was that he could have cured the damages
caused by the attorney's drafting error by advising their mother to disclaim the amount that was
needed to optimally fund the bypass trust. Id. at 456-57.
417 Id. at 474-75.
411 No. 27349, 2002 Ida. App. LEXIS 100 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002), aff'd, 87 P.3d
286 (Idaho 2003).
489 Id. at *3-5 ("[T]he parties d[id] not dispute that the trust instrument was defective in its
design ... ").
490 Id. at * 1-2.
1072 [Vol.78:1011
TAX MALPRACTICE-AN UPDATE
income from the property for life.49 1 The defect was discovered by the
plaintiffs in 1997 and this suit was subsequently instituted.492
Interestingly, the trust's alleged defects went unnoticed upon Albert's
death in 1983. 493
The case of Karam v. Kliber4 94 is also included in this portion of the
article though the alleged malpractice apparently involved the failure to
draft rather than erroneous drafting. To understand Karam, one must have
a basic understanding of the basic federal estate tax law and estate
planning techniques during the relevant years, 1987 to mid-1990s.
495
The federal estate tax provides a unified credit to each individual,
which enables each individual to transfer a certain amount of property free
from federal estate tax.496 During the relevant time period this amount was
$600,000. 49' The federal estate tax also has an unlimited marital deduction
so that no tax is incurred when property is left to a surviving spouse.498
Such property will be taxed upon the death of the surviving spouse, subject
to the surviving spouse's unified credit. When planning for a married
couple who have sufficient assets to be subject to tax, most often the
following approach is utilized: at the death of the first spouse a trust is
established, referred to in Karam as the "family trust,"499 to which
$600,000, the maximum that may be transferred without triggering the
estate tax, is transferred. This trust is designed so that it will not be
included in the estate of the surviving spouse. 50 0 The remaining assets are
placed in a trust (the "marital trust") for the surviving spouse, which is
eligible for the marital deduction. 50 1 The net result, which the Karam court
491 See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2000). The opinion also refers to a power of appointment
retained by Albert and Ora Anderson in trust, thereby possibly also triggering I.R.C. § 2041.
Anderson, 2002 Ida. App. LEXIS 100, at *3. However, the first footnote of the opinion indicates
that the power retained was not a general power of appointment, thereby taking it out of I.R.C. §
2041. Id. at *3 n.1.
492 Anderson, 2002 Ida. App. LEXIS 100, at *3-4.
493 See id. ("The Trust's alleged defects apparently went unnoticed and did not precipitate
any estate tax assessment upon Albert's death in 1983.").
494 655 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
495 Id. at 616-17 (detailing the estate tax ramifications of the unified credit and the marital
deduction, and the estate tax benefits of creating a family trust).
496 I.R.C. § 2010 (1994).
497 Prior to its amendment, I.R.C. § 2010(a) granted a unified credit of $192,800-the tax
corresponding to a transfer of $600,000. See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1994), amended by Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 501(a)(1)(A), 111 Stat. 788 (1997) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 2010(a) (2000)).
498 See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2000).
499 Karam, 655 N.W.2d at 616.
500 Id. at 616-17. Income from these assets and the assets themselves could be made
available for the use of the surviving spouse.
so' Id.
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refers to as the "normal" approach, °2 is that no estate tax is incurred upon
the death of the first spouse and the first spouse's unified credit is fully
utilized.
Under certain limited circumstances, a different estate planning
strategy may be utilized. Since the estate tax is a graduated tax, with
nominal tax rates between fourteen and fifty-five percent during the
relevant period,50 3 it was sometimes beneficial to split a couple's assets
into two equal portions so that half of their assets were taxed upon the
death of each spouse. This approach, referred to by the Karam court as an
"equalization" approach, 5°4 gives up the benefit of avoiding the payment of
any tax when the first spouse dies.
In Karam, the decedent's estate plan was drafted in 1987 by an
attorney who was now deceased. The estate plan contained an
"equalization" approach rather than the "normal" approach. In 1993, the
decedent met with a vice president of the defendant bank to review his
estate plan. The vice president allegedly described the decedent's estate
plan as utilizing the normal strategy. The vice president suggested certain
changes be made to the decedent's estate plan. The decedent then
contacted the defendant attorney who analyzed his trust as well as the vice
president's suggestions and who then drafted the decedent's will and an
amendment to the trust. Several additional amendments to the decedent's
trust were later drafted by the attorney. 5  When the decedent died in
1997, his trust still followed the equalization approach and this suit against
the attorney and the bank ensued. Apparently, though the opinion is not
very clear, the plaintiffs allege that the attorney should have, but failed to
amend the trust to adopt the normal rather than the equalization approach.
The opinion does not shed much light on the precise nature of the
alleged malpractice. The opinion focused on the evidentiary issue of
whether extrinsic evidence may be utilized by the plaintiffs since the
decedent's trust and will consistently established and followed an
equalization approach. The court concluded that resort to extrinsic
evidence was not permissible under Michigan law and affirmed the
summary judgment granted to the defendants by the trial court.506
502 Id at 617.
'0' See I.R.C. § 2001 (1994) (current version I.R.C. § 2001 (2000)). Under the old I.R.C. §
2001(c)(2) at certain levels above $10 million a five percent surcharge was also imposed. I.R.C.
§ 2001(c)(2) (1994) (current version I.R.C. § 2001 (2000)).
'04 Karam, 655 N.W.2d at 617.
506 Id. at 617-18.
116 Id. at 625.
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c. Disclaimers
If a person is to inherit property, and does not wish to accept the
inheritance, a rejection of the inheritance by any means other than a
qualified disclaimer 50 7 will result in the person being treated as if she or he
made a transfer subject to gift tax. 50 8 The theory behind this result is that
when a means other than a qualified disclaimer is used, what is occurring
is the acceptance of the inheritance, followed by a transfer to the ultimate
recipient.50 9 The same result occurs if a gift is rejected and then passed to
another recipient.510  Three recent cases have recognized that failure to
advise a client of the existence of the qualified disclaimer can result in
liability for malpractice.1 One other case has held it did not, at least
under the specific facts of that case.512
The three cases that held failing to advise a client of the existence of a
qualified disclaimer can constitute malpractice are Sims v. Hall,513 Hosfelt
v. Miller, 14 and Nikas v. Helms.515 Sims is very straightforward, holding
that an attorney who failed to advise about the potential for a qualified
disclaimer is liable for the additional taxes incurred.51 6 In Sims the
plaintiffs sister died intestate in January of 1997. Under South Carolina's
intestacy laws, all of her sister's assets were inherited by the plaintiffs
mother. On September 1, 1997, the plaintiffs mother died.517 Although a
qualified disclaimer could have been made either by plaintiffs mother
while alive or until mid-October by plaintiff as the personal representative
of her mother's estate, no disclaimer was made. The reason was that the
defendant attorney, who was retained by the plaintiff to help her settle her
sister's estate and her mother's estate, never advised her about qualified
disclaimers. As a result of the failure to disclaim, the sister's assets were
included in the mother's estate, and resulted in additional tax liability of
507 See I.R.C. § 2518(b) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(b) (2004)
508 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(1) (2004) ("[A]ny transaction in which an interest in
property is gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or devise
employed, constitutes a gift subject to tax.").
509 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 443, 10.01 [2][g], 10.07[ 1].
510 See id. However, simply rejecting a gift, which does not result in another person getting
it, should not have any tax consequences. See id. 10.01 [2] [g].
511 Nikas v. Helms, No. B158021, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2118, at *2, 9 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 5, 2003); Hosfelt v. Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5506, at *3, 14-15
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000); Sims v. Hall, 592 S.E.2d 315, 319 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
512 Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
113 592 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
114 No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5506 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000).
515 No. B158021, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2118 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2003).
516 Sims, 592 S.E.2d at 317-18.
117 Id. at317.
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over $191,000.518 The trial court's award to the plaintiff of these
additional taxes as damages was upheld on appeal, notwithstanding a




Hosfelt v. Miller is also relatively straightforward. Mr. Schaefer died
in January 1995. Mrs. Schaefer, as executrix, retained the defendant
attorney, Henderson, to perform services in the administration of her
husband's estate. Mrs. Schaefer, who at the time was dying of cancer, also
sought advice from Henderson regarding her own estate. 520 Henderson, it
is alleged, failed to advise her of the benefits of a qualified disclaimer.52'
Mrs. Schaefer died in December 1995, never having made a disclaimer of
assets received from her husband's estate, and never doing anything else to
avoid nearly $95,000 of estate tax ultimately incurred by her estate.5 22 The
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney because of
the lack of privity, but the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and sent the
matter back for trial. 523 While the bulk of the Hosfelt opinion dealt with
the issue of privity, and whether such a cause of action survived the death
of the person receiving the bad advice, the court made three noteworthy
observations with respect to damages. First, the court noted that
"[a]lthough necessary taxes may not constitute an injury to a client's
interests, taxes which could have been avoided by the exercise of the
knowledge, skill and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by legal
professionals under similar circumstances can be considered as an
injury. ,124 Second, in response to the defendant's argument that damages
in such cases are purely speculative because there is no way to know the
amount of taxes that will ultimately be incurred by the person failing to
disclaim, the court rightfully noted that when Mrs. Schaefer died, the
amount of avoidable estate taxes actually incurred became known
precisely. 25 Finally, the court also noted that other expenses incurred with
respect to Mr. Schaefer's estate, such as increased administration costs or
518 Id. at 317-18.
519 Id. at 318-20. The defendant attorney's primary challenge to the trial court's judgment
was that the plaintiff failed to introduce expert testimony to establish the standard of care he
owed to the plaintiff. The court, however, found that the defendant, in connection with his prior
motion for summary judgment, had admitted that an attorney had a duty to advise regarding the
option to execute a disclaimer. Id. at 319-20.
520 Hosfelt v. Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5506, at *1-3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 22, 2000).
521 Id. at *3.
522 Id at *4.
523 Id. at *17-18.
524 Id. at *14.
525 Id. at *15.
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costs incurred to correct mistaken filings, may also be recoverable.
526
Therefore, Hosfelt is entirely consistent with Sims, though the only
damages involved in Sims were the additional taxes incurred.
In Nikas, the plaintiffs father had died intestate in 1993. His mother
then hired the defendant attorney for estate planning. The court found that
one of the attorney's tasks in this regard was to plan to minimize the
eventual estate taxes upon his mother's death.527 The attorney, however,
failed to advise plaintiffs mother about a qualified disclaimer that would
have permitted the mother to give $600,000 to the plaintiff, free of estate
tax.
528
The issue in Nikas concerned the statute of limitations. Although the
plaintiffs mother had learned of the attorney's failure in July, 1994, the
present malpractice suit was commenced within one year after the death of
the plaintiffs mother in April, 2000. The relevant California statute of
limitations for legal malpractice required such a suit to be filed by the
earlier of either within one year after the plaintiff discovered, or should
have discovered, the injury, or within four years of the injury.529
In Nikas, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations was tolled
until his mother died in April 2000 with an estate large enough to incur
estate taxes. Before such time, he argued, there was no "actual injury"
because the damages were too speculative or contingent to support a cause
of action since his mother's estate might have decreased to where it
incurred no estate tax liability, or the estate tax might have been
abolished."3
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs argument and held that
actual injury was suffered when the time to file the qualified disclaimer
ended. At such time, the plaintiff failed to receive $600,000 tax free.
According to the court, the lost opportunity of using this $600,000
constituted damages, even if the mother's estate would later have incurred
no estate taxes upon her death. The suit was therefore barred by the statute
of limitations.531
Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus532 held that the attorney hired to help
the plaintiff administer her deceased husband's estate had no duty to
526 Id. at * 17.
527 Nikas v. Helms, No. B158021, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2118, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 5, 2003).
528 Id. at *2.
529 Id at *3 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (Deering 2004)).
530 Id. at *6-7.
531 Id. at *8-9.
532 765 A.2d 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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advise her about qualified disclaimers. 33 This case, however, is limited by
its facts. Here, the parties had specifically agreed that the attorney would
not render any tax or financial planning advice and that the plaintiff would
obtain such advice elsewhere.5 34 The court left open the possibility that
such a duty might exist in other circumstances. 35 In the present case,
however, the attorney's retainer agreement specifically eliminated any
such duty by the attorney to the plaintiff,536 and in the absence of a duty,
there can be no malpractice.
d Valuation
Frederick Road Limited Partnership v. Brown & Sturm537 was
previously discussed 538 and that discussion will not be repeated. In
Frederick Road Limited Partnership, the original malpractice at the heart
of the case was the incorrect valuation placed on land owned by Mr. and
Mrs. King. The defendant attorney placed an unacceptably low valuation
on the land by valuing it for farm-use only, rather than at its unrestricted,
highest and best use value. This had been accomplished by the very
simplistic, and ineffective, means of having the owners place a three-year
easement on the property limiting its use to only farm-use.5 39 In Frederick
Road Limited Partnership, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts' award of summary judgment to the defendant attorney and
remanded the case for trial.54°
Murphy v. Comptroller of the Treasury541 serves as a reminder that
failing to pay adequate attention to valuation issues may result in the
imposition of malpractice liability. Murphy was an interpleader action to
determine who was entitled to a sum of approximately $130,000. The sum
was the settlement received in a suit arising out of the defendant attorney's
alleged professional malpractice in "negligently valuing the estate's assets
and computing the estate's tax liability.542
... Id. at 260.
534 Id. at 254-55.
531 Id. at 259.
536 Id.
13' 756 A.2d 963 (Md. 2000).
538 See supra Part II.C.
"9 756 A.2d at 965-66.
540 Id at 986.
54' 207 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Md. 2002).
142 Id. at 401.
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E. Business-Related Tax Planning
1. Sales of Business or Property
In Clark v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 4 the plaintiffs owned an
insurance agency, which comprised the bulk of their retirement assets.
Nearing retirement, the plaintiffs obtained tax advice from their
accountants concerning how to dispose of their insurance agency at the
lowest tax cost. The defendants advised them to sell the insurance agency
back to the Farmers Insurance Company for a lump sum payment, thereby
obtaining favorable long term capital gains treatment. They were also
advised to complete the sale before December 31, 1986 since the law
would change on January 1, 1987 and the new law would not be as
favorable a.5  They followed their accountants' advice and sold the
insurance agency back to Farmers Insurance Company on December 31,
1986.
The plaintiffs' treatment of the sales proceeds as long term capital
gains was later disallowed by the IRS based upon a 1973 Tax Court case
which held that the lump sum payment received upon the sale of an
insurance agency to the Farmers Insurance Company was taxable as
ordinary income and not as long term capital gains.545
After litigating the matter in Tax Court, which upheld the IRS's
decision to tax the lump sum payment as ordinary income, the plaintiffs
incurred an additional $161,804 in taxes and penalties. 46 The suit for
malpractice and breach of contract against the accountants ensued.
Unfortunately, the court did not address the merits of the case, but rather
focused on whether the Utah statute of limitations barred the action.
5 47
BDO Seidman, L.L.P. v. British Car Auctions, Inc.,548 also involved
erroneous advice rendered by an accounting firm in connection with the
sale of assets. Although the precise nature of the advice is not clear, the
accounting firm advised the client that certain investment tax credits549
were available to shelter most of the gain to be incurred on the sale of
54' 34 P.3d 209 (Utah 2001).
'44 Id. at 210.
141 Id. at 210-11 (citing Deal v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 216 (1973)).
546 Id. at211.
547 After an extensive analysis of when the statute of limitations begins to run in
professional malpractice claims, the court held that the action was timely, and reversed the trial
court's motion to dismiss. Id. at 218.
148 745 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
549 See generally JOHN E. DAVIDIAN & JACOB L. TODRES, REDUCING PERSONAL INCOME
TAXES: A GUIDE TO DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS, §§ 14.08[5]-[6], 14.08[8] (6threpl. 1995).
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land.550  The advice turned out to be incorrect and the client sued to
recover the additional taxes and other costs it had incurred.55 1 Although
the plaintiff was successful at trial, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the relevant Tennessee statute of limitations barred the
552action.
In Spencer v. Sommer5 53 the plaintiff alleged that she relied on advice
given to her by the defendant attorney, and consequently sold property on
unfavorable terms. The property belonged to the plaintiffs father, who
had already contracted to sell it to one of the defendant's clients. Due to
various complications, the sale had not yet been consummated at the time
of the father's death in 1989. In 1990, the plaintiff negotiated a new
contract with the same client on less favorable terms than she presumably
could have received from other potential buyers. The plaintiff based her
decision on the defendant's advice that the client could enforce the initial
contract, and that such enforcement would result in "dire" tax
consequences. 554  This advice was alleged to be incorrect. 555
Unfortunately, Spencer did not address the substance of the allegation, but
focused only on statute of limitations issues. The court affirmed the trial
court's award of summary judgment to the defendant on statute of
limitations grounds. 56
2. Method of Accounting
Adopting or utilizing an incorrect method of accounting could easily
result in the imposition of malpractice liability." 7 Since this area involves
choosing or applying proper tax accounting principles, the most likely
defendant will be an accountant rather than an attorney. Two recent cases
involved accountants faced with such malpractice claims, although in both
the defendants avoided liability.
5 58
In Ideal Electronic Security Co. v. Brown559 the defendant accountant
avoided liability on statute of limitations grounds. The defendant in that
550 BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 745 So. 2d at 1082-83. The court quoted a letter from the client
to the accountant, which indicated that the land was sold only because the plaintiff expected tax
benefits. Id. at 1083.
... Id. at 1083.
552 Id. at 1084-85.
553 91 Fed. Appx. 48 (10th Cir. 2004).
114 Id. at 51.
555 Id.
556 Id. at 49.
557 See Todres, supra note 1, at 626-27.
558 See Ideal Elec. Sec. Co., v. Brown, 817 A.2d 806 (D.C. 2003); Hunter's Ambulance
Serv. Inc. v. Shernow, 798 A.2d 991 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
5'9 817 A.2d 806 (D.C. 2003).
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case rendered general accounting services, including the preparation of
financial statements and tax returns, to the plaintiff corporation. In 1991,
the plaintiff corporation split into two corporations, and the defendant
continued to prepare tax returns for one of the successor corporations from
1991 through 1993. These returns incorrectly treated unbilled
560
receivables. Interestingly, the accountant for the other successor
corporation similarly utilized the incorrect cash method rather than the
accrual method, of accounting.561 A number of years later, the IRS
assessed large sums against the plaintiffs for their incorrect tax filings.
Fortunately for defendant Brown, the court affirmed the jury's verdict, and
held that the statute of limitations had expired when this suit was
instituted. The plaintiffs simply sat on their rights too long.562
In Hunter's Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Shernow,563 the defendant
accountant avoided liability on much more fundamental grounds-there
was inadequate evidence to establish his responsibility. The plaintiff
corporation had purchased all the stock of another corporation in January
1989. Certain favorable treatment for the transaction would have been
available if the transaction had occurred during 1988 and if, in addition,
the plaintiff had filed a required notice with the IRS.564 Notwithstanding
the fact that the purchase occurred after 1988, the plaintiffs prior
accountant reported the transaction as if it had qualified for the favorable
1988 treatment, and consistently continued such treatment on the
plaintiffs 1989 and 1990 income tax returns.565 Plaintiff terminated the
employment of the prior accountant in the spring of 1991 and hired
Shernow, the defendant, as his replacement. The IRS commenced an audit
of plaintiff in 1992 that focused on this acquisition. At the end of the audit
in 1994, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency against the plaintiff for over
$200,000.566 In the action against Shernow the plaintiff alleged that
Shernow committed professional malpractice by not discovering the prior
accountant's error and notifying the plaintiff thereof and by continuing to
file subsequent tax returns as if the prior accountant properly reported the
acquisition.567 The evidence indicated, however, that although Shernow
560 Id. at 807-08. Though the opinion does not specify the nature of the error in any more
detail, inferentially it would appear that unbilled receivables were not reported as income.
561 Id. at 808.
562 Id. at 810-11.
563 798 A.2d 991 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); see supra Part II.A.2 (discussing other aspects of
this case).
'64 798 A.2d at 994.
565 Hunter's Ambulance Service, 798 A.2d at 994.
566 id.
567 Id. at 995.
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had repeatedly asked for the prior accountant's work papers, which might
have enabled him to ascertain the correct facts, these work papers were
never received.5 68 Accordingly, judgment was entered for the defendant,
which was subsequently affirmed on appeal.
569
3. Furnishing Incorrect Information Returns
570
Our federal income tax system imposes the obligation to file various
types of information returns on many different persons. For instance,
employers must report annual wages paid and taxes withheld on form W-
2, 57 1 payors of interest, dividends, royalties, and others must report such
amounts on annual forms 1099,572 and recipients of mortgage interest must
report such amounts annually on form 1098. Given the breadth and
complexity of the reporting requirements, the possibility of error and
resulting damages incurred would seem quite high.574 A recently reported
case illustrated such a situation, although it focused solely on statute of
limitation issues.
In Newhall v. Posner575 the plaintiff was a longtime employee,
officer, director, and shareholder in an S corporation 576 that was sold.
Upon the sale of the corporation the corporation's accountants prepared
information returns reporting how much of the shareholders' gains were
attributable to various states. An error was made on the California
information return, which reported that $11.7 million of capital gains were
100% attributable to California. In fact, only about nineteen percent was
attributable to California. As a result, substantial additional taxes, interest,
and penalties were initially paid to California. Substantial costs were then
incurred to correct the situation and recover the overpayments.577 The
plaintiff then sued the corporation's accountants for over $440,000 in
damages. 578 While the facts of Newhall present an almost classic textbook
568 Id. at 997-98.
569 Id. at 1001-02.
570 See generally Todres, supra note 5, at 261-63.
"' I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2000).
572 See, I.R.C. §§ 6049, 6042.
171 I.R.C. § 6050H.
574 The discussion in the text assumes the error was not corrected by the issuance of an
amended information form.
17' No. 03-11279-PBS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3257 (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2004).
576 An S Corporation generally does not pay federal income tax like a regular C Corporation
does. Instead, an S Corporation is a conduit which passes through its income and deductions to
its shareholders who report such items on their tax returns. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1363, 1366-
1368.
577 Newhall, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3257, at *3-6.
578 Id. at *6.
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case for a court to address the issues arising from, and damages
recoverable in, such a situation, the case focuses exclusively on, and
ultimately granted, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
statute of limitations grounds.579
4. Excessive Compensation
The United States employs a tax scheme known as double taxation.
58°
A corporation is taxed on the income it earns.58" ' When any remaining
earnings are distributed by the corporation to the individual shareholders,
the distributions are again subjected to tax as dividends.582 Increasing the
salaries paid to owners who are also employees of a closely held
corporation is an effective self-help method to reduce or eliminate the
double taxation. Since bona fide salaries paid by corporations are
deductible,583 one layer of the double tax is eliminated. As a consequence,
the IRS is very vigilant to disallow deductions for "unreasonable and
excessive compensation., 584 As a result, over the years many tax cases
have arisen which address whether compensation is excessive under such
circumstances.585
In Curtis v. Kellogg & Andelson,586 plaintiff-corporation, of which Dr.
Curtis was the sole shareholder, brought an action against its accountant,
alleging that the defendant advised the corporation to pay the shareholder's
wife compensation of over $431,000 in 1988 and over $510,000 in 1989.
The IRS subsequently disallowed all compensation paid in excess of
$100,000 and $105,000, respectively, 587 causing additional taxes of over
579 An interesting feature of the case that the court notes, but does not otherwise address, is
that the defendant accountants were never retained by the plaintiff. Id. at *3-4. If ever there were
a privity issue that begs for explication, this certainly is it.
580 See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1.03 (7th ed. 2000).
581 See I.R.C. § 11.
182 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7). When the shareholder is a corporation, a mechanism exists to
eliminate or substantially reduce the tax at the shareholder level so that the double tax does not
expand to become triple or quadruple taxation. See I.R.C. § 243 (allowing deductions for C
corporations receiving dividends).
583 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
584 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Salina, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 176, 178 (10th Cir.
1975).
585 See, e.g., Haffner's Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Commissioner, 326 F.3d 1, 2-5 (1st Cir. 2003)
(finding bonuses not reasonable compensation after considering the employer's performance,
comparable compensation and the employee's role in the company); Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 249 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 2001) (asserting excessive salary constituted
disguised dividend payments); Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 834 (7th
Cir. 1999) (interpreting and applying I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) on appeal).
586 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
587 Id. at 538.
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$300,000 to be incurred, in addition to legal fees for representation during
the audit and subsequent Tax Court proceedings and also mental, physical,
and emotional pain for which they sought to recover.5 88 While the case
had the potential to be groundbreaking on the issue of recoverable
damages, that issue was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.589
The plaintiffs in Curtis also attempted to recover from the attorneys
who represented them during an audit and in Tax Court, based on the
attorneys' failure to inform the plaintiffs of the existence of the
accountant's negligence.5 90 This claim was also dismissed on procedural
grounds, specifically for lack of standing. The original owner of the claim
was the corporate taxpayer. When the corporate taxpayer filed for
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee became the owner of the claim. Since
the trustee in bankruptcy never pursued the claim, and because California
law forbids assignment of legal malpractice claims, it was impossible to
transfer the claim either to the owner of the corporation or to the post-
bankruptcy corporation. The plaintiffs in this action, therefore, lacked
standing to bring this claim.
5 91
5. Benefit Plans
Because the tax rules relating to the benefits area are especially
complex and arcane,592 one would expect a substantial number of
malpractice cases in this area. However, only three recent cases were
discovered. 93 While all three raise the type of issue one would expect to
encounter in this area, none of them addressed the substance.
In Finderne Management Co. v. Barrett, several small business
entities were fraudulently prompted to establish a welfare benefit plan for
their employees.594 Prior to establishing the plan, and during its early years
of operation, they were promised that contributions to the plan would be
tax deductible. Later it was determined that the tax deduction was not
available and this suit was brought against the insurance agents and
financial planners for making the false representations.595 The New Jersey
588 Id at 538-39.
9 See id at 541-44.
'90 Id. at 539.
'9' Id. at 544-47.
592 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401-409 (2000) (discussing qualified pension, profit-sharing, and
stock bonus plans).
593 DiMartino v. Somerset Fin. Servs., No. IP 03:cv-0672-JDT-WTL, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24222 (S.D. Ind. 2003); Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn.
1999); Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 809 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
594 Finderne Mgmt. Co., 809 A.2d at 859.
'9' Id. at 859-60.
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Appellate Court affirmed a dismissal due to lack of privity between the
defendant and the plaintiffs accountant, and also between two third-party
defendants and the plaintiffs accountant.
596
DiMartino v. Somerset Financial Services 97 likewise involved an
accountant financial advisor who advised the plaintiff and her professional
corporation to set up a benefit plan. Similarly, the promised tax benefits
later turned out to be unavailable.5 98 The opinion, however, addressed only
a jurisdictional issue, concluding that state jurisdiction was appropriate.5 99
Under the rules governing benefit plans, a substantial excise tax and
interest is imposed on a disqualified person who engages in a prohibited
transaction with a related benefit plan.600 In Herrmann v. McMenomy &
Severson,60 1 the plaintiff employer brought a suit against his attorney
602
alleging that the attorney negligently failed to advise the plaintiff that
certain transactions it entered into with its employee benefit plan violated
this prohibition and would be subject to the excise tax. Unfortunately, the
case focused solely on the statute of limitations, ultimately holding that
under Minnesota law, the case was time-barred.6 3
6. Section 1031-Like-Kind Exchanges
Section 1031 of the I.R.C. is a useful provision because it enables
taxpayers to make an exchange for "like-kind" property without
immediately recognizing taxable gain.604 In Montes v. Asher & Co.,605 the
plaintiffs owned a McDonald's restaurant which they sold back to the
company. In connection with the transaction they sought accounting
assistance and advice from the defendant accountant. Part of their
discussions with the accountant included the possibility of purchasing
another restaurant. The accountant never discussed the availability of a §
1031 like-kind exchange with the plaintiffs although, she later
596 Id. at 859. In a related case, Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 809 A.2d 842 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002), the same New Jersey Appellate Court held the present suit against the
defendants was not preempted under the federal ERISA preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. §
114 4 (a) (2000). Id. at 843.
597 No. IP 03:cv-0672-JDT-WTL, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24222 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
598 Id. at *7-8.
... Id. at *44-45.
60 See generally I.R.C. § 4975 (2000).
601 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999).
602 The suit was also brought against plaintiff's accountants, but they were not part of this
appeal. Id. at 642 n.l.
6 Id. at 642-44.
W4 1.R.C. § 103 1(a) (2000).
o 182 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
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acknowledged, it "might have eliminated some of the taxable gain from the
sale of their restaurant.
60 6
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of liability, holding that failing to discuss the like-kind exchange
option was a clear breach of the standard of care owed by an accountant to
a client, and a reasonable jury could not find otherwise.60 7 The case was
sent back for trial on the issues of damages.608
7. Section 1033-Involuntary Conversions
Under I.R.C. § 1033 when a taxpayer's property is involuntarily
converted, at the election of the taxpayer, any resulting gain need not be
reported for federal income tax purposes if the taxpayer purchases suitable
replacement property within a designated time.60 9 The entire gain may go
unrecognized only if the taxpayer spends on the replacement property an
amount at least equal to the proceeds received from the disposition of the
old property. If the taxpayer spends less on the replacement property than
was received from the old property, gain is recognized equal to the excess
of the non-reinvested proceeds.610
Due to the operation of § 1033's basis rules, the unrecognized gain
does not permanently escape taxation, but is simply deferred until such
time as the replacement property is disposed of.611
In J.D. Warehouse v. Lutz & Co.,61 2 a partnership, under threat of
condemnation, sold a warehouse for $3.15 million in May of 1988,
resulting in a realized gain of over $2.44 million. In 1989, the partners
consulted with the defendant accountant concerning the requirements for
gain deferral under I.R.C. § 1033. The accountant erroneously advised
606 Id. at 637.
607 Id.
608 Id. at 638.
609 See I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2). An involuntary conversion would include property destruction,
theft, or forced sale under condemnation or the threat or imminence thereof. Id § 1033(a). A gain
may arise under such involuntary circumstances if the amount received from insurance proceeds
or from the purchaser in a forced sale exceeds the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property.
610 Id. § 1033(a)(2)(A).
61 Under I.R.C. § 1033(b)(2), the basis of the replacement property is its cost less the
unrecognized gain on the involuntarily converted property. This preserves the unrecognized gain
for later recognition. To illustrate, assume a taxpayer has property worth $1 million in which the
basis is $100,000. Upon destruction of the property, assume insurance proceeds of $1 million are
received. If section 1033 treatment is elected, the $900,000 gain is not recognized. However, if
replacement property costing $2 million is purchased by the taxpayer, its tax basis will be only
$1.1 million (i.e., its cost ($2 million) less the unrecognized gain ($900,000)). The previously
unrecognized gain of $900,000 is now preserved in the replacement property that is worth $2
million but has a tax basis of only $1.1 million.
612 639 N.W.2d 88 (Neb. 2002).
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them that the entire gain could be deferred if they purchased suitable
replacement property for an amount equal to the $2.44 million gain on the
sale. Relying on this advice they timely purchased suitable replacement
property costing $2.5 million. The error was caught in 1992 by the IRS
during an audit of the 1988 tax return, resulting in additional tax and
interest, but no penalties, imposed on over $520,000 of capital gains.613
The partnership and the individual partners filed suit against the accountant
and his firm, claiming malpractice. The plaintiffs sought to recover the
additional federal and state taxes and interest; attorney and accountant fees
incurred; the estimated value of an investment tax credit lost by one of the
partners; 614 and the estimated loss of time and income by two of the
partners in dealing with the problem.615
The trial court had no difficulty in finding the defendants liable. The
court found the error by the accountant clearly fell below the standard of
care applicable to accountants in the area and that the plaintiffs had relied
on the accountant's advice. The only remaining issue requiring analysis
was determination of damages.616
One of the trial court's most significant holdings was its rejection of
the defendants' argument that valuation of the "loss of a right to defer
income necessarily requires speculation and conjecture, as a matter of law,
and... cannot therefore serve as the basis for a damage award., 61 7 The
trial court further found "the value of the loss of the tax deferral may
constitute recoverable damage if it can be established with a reasonable
degree of certitude. 6t 8 Nevertheless, the court did not award damages of
this type.
The trial court's holding with respect to the recovery of additional
taxes is also noteworthy. The trial court essentially held that the
defendant's advice was not the legal "cause" of these damages. The trial
court reasoned that the plaintiffs incurred the tax liability in May of 1988
when they sold the warehouse. Since utilization of § 1033 merely defers,
but does not eliminate the tax liability, the court concluded that the
accountant's erroneous advice given in 1989 did not create the plaintiffs
tax liability. Therefore, because the defendants were not the "legal cause"
of the additional taxes, no damages were recoverable. 619 The trial court's
opinion, failed to consider the critical point that the accountant was
613 Id. at 90-91.
614 The court never explained the nature of this loss.
615 J.D. Warehouse, 639 N.W.2d at 91.
616 Id. at 91.
617 id.
618 id.
619 Id. at 91-92.
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specifically retained to obtain § 1033 treatment and that, but for his
negligence, no tax would have been owed for 1988. This brings the
analysis back to determining the value of the ability to defer taxes, which
the trial court had just endorsed in principle but did not apply.
The trial court also held that the interest 620 imposed on the plaintiffs
by the IRS was not recoverable. 62' Because the plaintiffs had the use of
the money, the court simply held paying the IRS simple interest was not
really damages suffered by the plaintiffs, and not recoverable.622
Interestingly, the court did not even bother to acknowledge the existing
split amongst the states on this issue.623
With respect to the other elements of damages sought by the
plaintiffs, the trial court: (a) while not rejecting outright the claims of the
two partners for lost time and income, did not award any damages on these
claims; (b) held the partner's claimed loss of an investment tax credit was
not recoverable since it was to be treated as part of the claim for additional
taxes; and (c) did award damages equal to the attorney fees of $10,000
incurred in connection with the audit.624
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered the issue to be
whether the capital gains tax, interest and the value of the partner's lost
investment tax credit were recoverable damages. 625 The court reiterated
some basic and noncontroversial principles, for instance, noting that the
purpose of damages is to place the injured party in the same position, as far
as money can do, as the party would have been in had there been no injury.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also pointed out that while damages need
not be established by the plaintiff with mathematical certainty, damages
cannot be established by speculative or conjectural evidence.626 However,
the court sidestepped addressing the substantive issues before it, instead
holding that there was insufficient evidence before the trial court to
establish the amount of any damages other than $10,000 in attorney fees.627
The problem was that the case was tried based on stipulated facts. While
the stipulation indicated that additional capital gain of over $520,000 was
found by the IRS, and that additional taxes and interest were actually paid
620 The IRS did not impose any penalties on the plaintiffs so the recovery of penalties was
not in issue. Id. at 92.
621 Id.
622 Id.
623 For a discussion of the split among the courts, see supra text accompanying notes
274-85. See generally Rule, supra note 276, at 176.
624 J.D. Warehouse, 639 N.W.2d at 91-92.
625 Id. at 92.
626 Id. at 92-93.
627 Id. at 93-94.
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by each partner,628 the amounts of such payments were never indicated in
the stipulation.629
Alas! What could have been a groundbreaking opinion in the area of
damages in a tax-deferral situation was not to be!
CONCLUSION
It is not possible to simply tally up either the number of cases
discussed herein or the number of cases cited and present a list of the areas
most frequently litigated. A number of cases reviewed never found their
way into this article. While I would like to think I applied definitive
standards consistently to decide what was included and what was
excluded, unfortunately, those decisions were much more judgmental. An
extra sentence or two describing the underlying tax malpractice in a bit
more detail might easily have swayed me to include a case that otherwise
addresses a statute of limitations issue not relevant to this article. In
addition, many cases involved allegations of several different acts of
malpractice, some of which were obviously make-weight and not really
deserving of attention. Accordingly, the conclusions herein involve a good
measure of value judgment rather than a precise tally of cases.
In the years since Malpractice I, the specific area that seems to have
630generated the most cases is the estate planning/estate and gift tax area.
There seems to be a steady stream of cases involving either planning or
drafting errors.631 Similarly, the failure to advise a client of the existence
and/or benefit of the qualified disclaimer has been a recurring issue.
632
This finding is consistent with Malpractice I in which this area was one of
the two leading areas in generating tax malpractice claims. The second
leading area in Malpractice I, cases relating to tax shelters, has quieted
down, as predicted in Malpractice J,633 presumably due to the crackdown
628 In partnership taxation, the partnership is a pass-through entity that files a tax return but
does not pay tax. Tax is paid by each partner on his/her ratable share of partnership income and
deductions. See I.R.C. § 701 (2000).
629 J.D. Warehouse, 639 N.W.2d at 93-94.
630 Conceptually, the generation skipping transfer tax ("GST tax") should also be included
together with the estate and gift tax-it is the third member of the trio of taxes that presently
comprises the IRC's transfer taxes-however, as indicated previously, see supra note 17, no
cases involving the GST tax have been encountered. In light of the complexity of the GST tax it
is most likely that such cases will soon reach the reporters. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-032 (June 9,
1997).
631 See supra Part II D.2.a-b. See generally Begleiter, supra note 17, at 347-50 (discussing
malpractice cases in the estate planning area).
632 See supra Part II D.2.c.
633 See Todres, supra note 1, at 641.
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on tax shelters that culminated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.634 A
resurgence of such cases may arise in future years, as the extent and
ferocity of the IRS's attack on the shelters of the mid-1990s becomes more
defined and as taxpayers seek to recover some of their unrealized tax
benefits from the tax advisors who recommended the faulty shelters.
The next largest area, after the estate planning/estate and gift tax area,
is probably a combination of the late filing/non-filing and negligent
preparation areas discussed in Parts II.B.2-3 above. These areas, though,
do not involve one area of the tax law but rather represent a more general
type of sloppiness or inattentiveness. Beyond these, there seem to be at
most two to three cases that may have arisen in any one area, each with its
own unique wrinkle or twist.
As was true in Malpractice I, it is this author's view that, upon
reflection, the estate planning/estate and gift tax area is a most logical
candidate for the top spot in tax malpractice areas. It involves a network
of interrelated areas, many with highly technical and intricate requirements
in which the opportunity for error is ever present. For instance, charitable
and marital deductions,635 the Q-TIP election,636 and sections 2035 to
2038637 and 2041638 are as technical and strewn with minefields as any
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. In addition to the
complexity, this is an area in which there is often no personal relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant. While the decedent may have had
such a relationship with the defendant, the heirs typically have not. When
an heir feels entitled to more than he or she has received, there is no
restraining influence of any personal relationship or the memory of other
successful representations. It is very easy to simply sue the draftsman of
the will or the tax advisor, especially when they may appear to have deep
pockets.
Concerning the correct measure of damages, the most telling
observation is that most of the cases discussed herein do not focus on the
measure of damages. With respect to all areas of tax malpractice other
than estate planning/estate and gift tax, the tax professionals frequently
634 See Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
611 I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2056 (2000); see, e.g., Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C.,
568 S.E.2d 693 (Va. 2002), discussed supra Part II.D.2.b (charitable deduction).
636 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7); see, e.g., Boardman v. Stark, No. 20911, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
3790 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2002), discussed supra Part I.D.2.a.
637 I.R.C. § 2035-38.; see, e.g., Harmeyer v. Gustafson, No. C8-00-1191, 2001 Minn. App.
LEXIS 175 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2001), discussed supra Part II.D.2.b.
63 I.R.C. § 2041; see, e.g., Porter v. Ogden, Newell & Welch, 241 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.
2001), discussed supra Part II.D.2.b.
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escaped liability by reason of the statute of limitations.639 In the estate
planning/estate and gift tax area there are a number of additional
procedural obstacles that often prevent the imposition of damages. Among
these additional obstacles are issues of privity, sometimes presented as
lack of standing,64 ° the fact that in certain jurisdictions tax malpractice
actions do not survive the death of the wronged party64 1 and the principle
that speculative damages are not recoverable. 42
While the unique set of procedural issues in the estate planning/estate
and gift tax area suggest this area ideally should be analyzed separately
from other tax malpractice areas,643 from a pragmatic standpoint, the areas
have been combined herein since the basic types of recoverable damages
seem to be roughly the same across all areas of tax malpractice. The basic
elements of damages include any additional taxes caused by the
malpractice, as well as interest and penalties and all corrective or
mitigating costs incurred, such as attorney or accountant fees for filing late
or amended returns, for representation before the IRS, or for litigation to
minimize or eliminate the damages caused by the malpractice. 44  With
respect to additional taxes, the amount recoverable would include only
taxes that could have been avoided with non-negligent advice.645
However, if taxes were already incurred, but errors mislead the taxpayer to
believe that less is owed, the additional taxes will not be recoverable since
they were not really caused by the malpractice. 46  To illustrate, if a
taxpayer owes $100,000 in taxes, but the return preparer errs and advises
the taxpayer that only $80,000 is owed, the additional $20,000 would not
639 See, e.g., Tony Smith Trucking v. Woods & Woods, Ltd., 55 S.W.3d 327 (Ark. Ct. App.
2001); Avakian v. Ohanessian, No. B 150367, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9275 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 3, 2002); Noel v. Hoover, 12 P.3d 328 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); Inphoto Surveillance Inc. v.
Crowe, Chizek & Co., 788 N.E.2d 216 (I11. App. Ct. 2003); Wiste v. Neff& Co., 967 P.2d 1172
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998), discussed supra Part II.B-D.
640 See, e.g., Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 93
P.3d 337 (Cal. 2004) (standing); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452 (Haw. 2001) (privity), discussed supra
Part II.B.2, D.2.b.
641 See, e.g., Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., 568 S.E.2d 963 (Va. 2002),
discussed supra Part II.D.2.b.
642 See, e.g., Hanneyer, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 175, discussed supra Part II.D.2.b (same).
643 See, e.g., Begleiter, supra note 17; see also Bradley E.S. Fogel, Estate Planning
Malpractice: Special Issues in Need of Special Care, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2003, at 20.
644 See, e.g., Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah L.L.P., No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS
461, at *25 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002); Hosfelt v. Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5506, at *15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000); King v. Neal, 19 P.3d 899, 901 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2001), discussed supra Parts II.B.3, II.D. .b, II.D.2.c.
64 See, e.g., Pytka, 2002 Mass. Super LEXIS 461 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002); King,
19 P.3d 899, discussed supra Part II.B.3, II.D. 1.b.
646 See, e.g., J.D. Warehouse v. Lutz & Co., 639 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Neb. 2002), discussed
supra Part II.E.7.
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be recoverable from the return preparer since his or her error did not cause
the additional taxes to be incurred. The contrary holds true with regards to
any interest or penalties that resulted from the underreporting of the taxes
owed.
There continues to be a split among the states with respect to the
recovery of interest charged in connection with a tax underpayment. Some
states allow the recovery of interest as simply being a natural,
consequential component of damages incurred by a wronged plaintiff.6 47
Other states refuse to allow any recovery for interest on the ground that it
would be duplicative of the benefit already enjoyed by the plaintiff, that of
having had the use of the money. 648 A third view has recently emerged
that only allows a recovery of the differential between the interest paid to
the government and the interest actually earned on the money while the
plaintiff possessed it.
6 49
Punitive or exemplary damages may be recoverable under appropriate
circumstances,65° while no recovery is generally available for emotional
distress or mental anguish. 651 Under the so-called American Rule, most
states do not allow recovery of attorney's fees incurred to litigate the
malpractice action.652  These non-recoverable attorney's fees must be
distinguished from recoverable attorney's fees incurred to correct or
mitigate damages caused by the malpractice. Thus, for instance, attorney's
fees are recoverable for the cost of litigation necessary to avoid paying
penalties imposed by the IRS on account of the tax malpractice.653
While these basic general principles seem reasonably well
established, many issues remain open. For instance, the general rule that
only foreseeable consequential damages may be recovered has been held to
prevent any recovery for suicide committed by a taxpayer who may have
been misadvised as to a tax matter.654 However, it is interesting to
speculate whether the costs incurred by the plaintiff in Porter v. Ogden,
647 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse L.L.P., 971 P.2d 414, 417-20 (Or. Ct. App.
1998); discussed supra Part II.B.3; see also Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734 n.47 (5th Cir.
2000); Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (D.N.J. 1999), discussed supra Part
II.D. l.a.
648 See, e.g., J.D. Warehouse, 639 N.W.2d at 93-94, discussed supra Part II.E.7.
649 See, e.g., Streber, 221 F.3d at 734-35, discussed supra Part II.D.l.a.
650 See, e.g., King, 19 P.3d at 900, discussed supra Part II.B.3. In King, the jury considered,
but did not award, punitive damages. King, 19 P.3d at 900; see also Todres, supra note 1, at 644.
651 See, e.g., McCulloch, 971 P.2d at 421, discussed supra Part II.B.3.
652 See Todres, supra note 1, at 644.
653 See e.g., Streber, 221 F.3d at 716-17, discussed supra Part II.D.l.a.
654 See Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2002), discussed supra Part
II.B.3.
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Newell & Welch655 to lobby the Florida legislature to change Florida law to
solve his tax problem would be recoverable consequential damages.
Similarly, the issue of grossing-up damages so the amount recovered on an
after-tax basis is equal to the damages incurred seems to be conceptually
appealing, despite its rejection by Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah, L.L.P. 656
Finally, many desirable Internal Revenue Code provisions involve tax
deferral rather than total tax avoidance.657 While the trial court in J.D.
Warehouse v. Lutz & Co. 658 held that loss of the opportunity to defer taxes
may constitute recoverable damages, it nevertheless did not award any.
The Nebraska Supreme Court sidestepped the issue on appeal, based on the
absence of adequate evidence. 659 How damages would be determined in
such circumstances is most interesting.66 ° Perhaps there will be a reported
decision on remand in Montes v. Asher & Co.,661 which is to address this
issue.
In short, many intriguing issues remain unanswered concerning the
question of precisely what damages are recoverable in tax malpractice
actions.
615 241 F.3d 1134 (1 1th Cir. 2001); see supra, Part II.D.2.b.
616 No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 461 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002); see
supra Part II.D. 1 .b.
657 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1033 (2000), discussed supra, Part II.E.6-7.
65 639 N.W.2d 88 (Neb. 2002); see supra, Part I.E.7.
659 JD. Warehouse, 639 N.W.2d at 93; see supra Part II.E.7.
660 One commentator has expressed the view that damages ought not be recoverable in such
circumstances. See Jeffrey A. Rich, Financial Professionals' Liability To Clients for Lost Tax
Benefits, 80 TAX NOTES 217 (1998).
661 182 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see supra Part II.E.6.
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